Political Mobilization of Georgian IDPs by Røkke, Thea
 I 
 
 
Political Mobilization of Georgian 
IDPs  
 
 
 
Thea Røkke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master Thesis  
European and American Studies 
Faculty of Humanities 
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO  
 
Autumn 2012  
 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Thea Røkke 
2012 
Political Mobilization of Georgian IDPs 
Thea Røkke 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 
Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo 
IV 
Abstract 
After the secession from the Soviet Union, Georgia found itself independent, but at war with 
two of its regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a consequence of the war between 
Abkhazia and Georgia nearly all ethnic Georgians residing within the territory of Abkhazia 
were displaced, and thus went on to become Internally Displaced People (IDPs). Since their 
displacement nineteen years ago, Georgian authorities have largely pursued a policy of 
temporary integration, with an ultimate goal of the return of the IDPs to their homes in the 
breakaway regions. By conducting an explorative case study, based on thirty in-depth 
interviews with Georgian IDPs and experts on IDP issues, I have researched whether or not 
the Georgian IDPs have mobilized politically and what form their mobilization has assumed. I 
have also looked at whether or not their mobilization has been successful, determined by the 
government’s response to the IDPs demands. I have used theories on Relative Deprivation, 
Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity Structure to shed light on my empirical data, 
and concluded that the Georgian IDPs have mobilized politically. Their mobilization 
manifests itself in two separate channels: institutionalized organizations and informal groups 
conducting episodes of contentious politics. The two channels of mobilization utilize different 
Repertoires of Contention to put forth their claims to the Georgian government, and have both 
been successful in their efforts. The Georgian government has largely accommodated the 
claims put forth by the Georgian IDPs, however this can’t be attributed to the efforts of the 
IDPs alone, the IDPs have an influential ally in the international community present in 
Georgia, which advocates for IDP interests and puts pressure on the government.  
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1 Introduction 
Georgia’s secession from the Soviet Union in 1991 represented a turning point in the 
country’s history: having been subject to Moscow’s rule since 18013 the country now found 
itself independent, but in utter political turmoil. Twenty-one years, four wars4, one coup d’état 
and a revolution later the territorial stability is not yet consolidated. The source of this 
uncertainty is the conflict between Georgia and the breakaway regions Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia5, which have managed to establish themselves as separate states de facto, de iure they 
still form a part of Georgia proper.  
The persistent volatility that has characterized the relationship between Georgia and its 
breakaway regions since the three wars in the early 1990s was further entrenched in 2008, 
when a fourth war broke out. This time Russia and Georgia went to war over the 
independence of the breakaway regions. As an aspiring member of both NATO and EU, 
Georgia looked to the West for assistance, and a peace agreement was brokered with the aid 
of the European Union. The introduction of such large-scale international stakeholders to the 
conflict lent it a symbolic meaning that further complicated finding a solution. The conflict 
was no longer confined to independency for the breakaway regions; it now came to epitomize 
the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West (Trier et al, 2010:1). Since 2008 
the war rhetoric has been mitigated, and the situation is less acute, but the core issue remains 
unresolved; what will happen to Abkhazia and South Ossetia with regards to their 
independence? The answer to this question largely determines the faith of those most affected 
by the war; the Internally Displaced People (IDPs). If Abkhazia and South Ossetia are 
reintegrated to Georgia proper, the IDPs might be able to return to their homes in the 
breakaway regions, but as long as the republics remain autonomous, the IDPs are left to lead 
their lives in displacement.  
                                                 3	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  years	  1918	  to	  1921,	  when	  Georgia	  formed	  a	  democratic	  state.	  Georgia	  was	  independent	  from	  the	  Russian	  Empire	  until	  it	  was	  annexed	  by	  the	  Red	  Army	  in	  1921,	  and	  became	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union. 4	  Between	  1989	  and	  1993,	  three	  wars	  took	  place	  in	  Georgia:	  the	  first	  one	  over	  the	  breakaway	  region	  of	  South	  Ossetia,	  the	  second	  one	  was	  fought	  between	  rival	  Georgian	  groups	  trying	  to	  establish	  their	  political	  power,	  and	  the	  third	  war	  was	  fought	  over	  the	  breakaway	  region	  of	  Abkhazia.	  A	  fourth	  war	  took	  place	  much	  later,	  in	  2008,	  between	  Georgia	  and	  Russia	  and	  was	  fought	  primarily	  in	  and	  around	  South	  Ossetia.	   5	  Adjara	  also	  forms	  a	  separate	  republic,	  but	  was	  peacefully	  reintegrated	  into	  Georgia	  in	  April	  2004	  under	  the	  Saakashvili	  administration.  
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 The IDPs are Georgian civilians who were forced to flee their homes in the breakaway 
regions during the wars. There have been several waves of displacement parallel to the waves 
of hostilities: the first main influx of IDPs to Georgia took place between 1989 and 1993 and 
the majority of the displaced were primarily fleeing from Abkhazia. The second main influx 
occurred in August 2008, this time the majority of IDPs came from South Ossetia. However, 
both waves contained IDPs from both regions. Today Georgia has a total population of 
258,599 IDPs 6 according to the main authority on IDP issues in Georgia: the Ministry of 
Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of 
Georgia (MRA).  
Due to the lack of an extensive peace agreement the IDPs have not yet been able to 
return to their homes. The majority of the Georgian IDPs has been displaced for almost two 
decades, but they are still struggling to obtain access to fundamental resources such as 
housing and livelihood. This is largely because the Georgian authorities have attempted a 
political balancing act by pursuing two policies simultaneously: return and integration. Return 
of the IDPs to their homes in the breakaway regions has to be a goal for the Georgian 
authorities, as giving up on it would mean giving up on reuniting the breakaway regions with 
Georgia proper. At the same time, ensuring a decent living standard, livelihoods and future 
prospects is the responsibility of any state hosting IDPs, hence the policy of integration. Being 
kept in suspense, what have the IDPs themselves fought for, if anything? Do they wish to 
return or to integrate in displacement? The general public discourse has led to the 
politicization of both the existence of IDPs and their options for the future.  
1.1 Main Topic for Thesis 
There exists little research on the political mobilization of IDPs, I have therefore chosen to 
put together a framework of established theories on political mobilization, and used this as a 
starting point for developing an explorative case study. By using the theoretical framework 
and empirical data dialectically throughout the thesis, I will determine the following:  
                                                 
6	  MRA’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://mra.gov.ge/main/ENG#section/50	  accessed	  06.11.2012.	  There	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  numbers	  in	  circulation,	  but	  the	  MRA	  is	  the	  only	  actor	  who	  comprehensively	  registers	  and	  collects	  data	  on	  citizens	  with	  IDP	  status.	  See	  IDMC’s	  website	  for	  more	  information:	  http://www.internal-­‐displacement.org	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I will establish (i) if the Georgian IDPs have mobilized politically, and (ii) examine which 
form the mobilization has assumed, and (iii) find out whether or not the mobilization has been 
successful by examining the government’s response to the IDPs demands. 
1.2 Operationalization of the Main Terms 
In order to identify political mobilization and obtain an understanding of the mechanisms 
creating and sustaining political mobilization, it is necessary to operationalize and define the 
key terms. The term mobilization is according to the Oxford dictionary defined as: “to 
organize and encourage (a group of people) to take collective action in pursuit of a particular 
objective”.7 This presupposes an inherent plurality to the act of mobilization, meaning that for 
action to be considered mobilization it has to be organized and implemented by a group of 
people. An individual is linked to a group by a shared social reality, forming a collective 
identity. According to Polletta and Jasper, collective identity is defined as:  
[…] an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, 
category,  practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be 
imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although 
it may form part of a personal identity (2001:298). 
Although collective and personal identities are not two sides of the same coin, collective 
identity can form a part of a personal identity. Identifying with a group can be an important 
factor when deciding whether or not one should participate in collective action. Not all groups 
with a collective identity mobilize politically: this depends on the nature of the shared trait 
that brought the group together in the first place. But for those who do aim to mobilize, the 
collective identity facilitates the pursuit of the shared objective. With a collective identity it is 
easier to put forth claims on behalf of the entire group. This in turn enables a dialogue with 
different audiences, such as state authorities (Polletta and Jasper, 2001:285).  
For the mobilization to be considered political it has to be directed towards the 
government. Any interaction between citizens and authorities is in a sense political, but 
political mobilization entails collective action directed specifically towards the authorities. 
When a movement puts forth claims that are directed towards the state authorities, the 
authorities have the option of either facilitating the claims or repressing them. If the 
                                                 
7Oxford	  Dictionary’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/mobilize?q=mobilization#mobilize__8	  accessed	  06.11.2012 
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mobilization is successful, the government will comply with the claims (Tilly, 2003:32). By 
struggling for the recognition of their claims the group enters political life and becomes a part 
of the struggle for political power. When examining which form the mobilization has 
assumed, I will look at which tools the IDPs have utilized to reach their goals, and how they 
have conducted their acts of mobilization.   
1.3 Demarcations in Time and Space.  
As mentioned the Georgian IDPs come both from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The political 
mobilization of IDPs from South Ossetia will be excluded from this thesis. There are several 
reasons for this decision8: the two groups were displaced under different political regimes, 
which has had a profound effect on the treatment and quality of the aid the IDPs received 
directly after displacement. Where the IDPs from South Ossetia were allotted housing in the 
vicinity of the de facto border shortly after the war ended, many of the IDPs from Abkhazia 
are still squatting public houses twenty years after the conflict that displaced them. This is 
partly due to the fact that the first IDPs were displaced within a context of chaos and turmoil, 
while the second displacement happened within a more unified political system. This creates 
two different starting points for political mobilization. Additionally, the extended period of 
displacement of the IDPs from Abkhazia leaves room for a more fertile analysis. According to 
political mobilization theory, openings in the Political Opportunity Structures provide ample 
grounds for mobilization (Tarrow, 2011:160). Studying the group that has been displaced for 
the longest period of time is therefore more interesting simply because there is more data to 
look at. The natural timeframe for this thesis therefore becomes the time from displacement 
and up until today (1993 to 2012).   
1.4 Relevance of the Topic of Research 
When I began writing this thesis, I had already lived and worked six months in Georgia as an 
intern for the Danish Refugee Council. The experience of and understanding for Georgian 
culture I had acquired during this period proved to be an advantage as I tried to determine 
what the main research question for this thesis would be. I had already read a lot of the 
existing literature on Georgian IDPs, and I noticed that little had been written on their 
                                                 
8	  Even	  though	  the	  IDPs	  from	  South	  Ossetia	  are	  excluded	  from	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  still	  analyze	  the	  2008	  war	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  IDP	  mobilization.	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political views. The question of their return and the treatment they have received in 
displacement has been debated and politicized, but there were few, if any, studies that 
examined what the IDPs wanted for their future, and whether or not they had mobilized to 
reach their goals.  
Researching political mobilization among Georgian IDPs is important on several 
levels: Nationally, the Georgian government faces a substantial challenge trying to 
accommodate the large population of IDPs, finding out what the IDP community identifies as 
their primary needs could help clarify what areas the Georgian government should focus on 
first. More knowledge on the internal mechanisms and diversity within the IDP community 
might challenge the humanitarian tradition of treating all as a homogeneous group when 
providing protection, the help given could be improved and tailored to the needs of the IDPs. 
The political life of IDPs is also interesting because they form such a large part of the 
electorate in Georgia. Their sheer numbers provide this group with a massive potential to 
influence national politics.  
 In a regional perspective, the mobilization of the displaced is interesting as it could 
influence the outcome of the conflict: if there is a strong will and preference among the IDPs 
to return to the breakaway regions, and a strong mobilization towards this goal, it could be a 
step on the way to returning the breakaway regions to Georgia proper. If they have a strong 
preference to stay in Georgia proper and integrate in displacement, the government will have 
lost the argument of return of the IDPs as leverage towards the breakaway regions and the 
reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia proper will be even less likely.  
There are currently an estimated 25 million IDPs residing in 52 countries across the 
world9. As a consequence of increased levels of globalization and thereby state inter-
dependency, the nature of warfare has changed. From being an event primarily taking place 
between two states, there has been a shift towards an increased frequency of civil wars 
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1996). This has led to a decline in the number of refugees, and 
an increase in the number of IDPs (Weiss, 1999:363). Thus, understanding the political 
mobilization of IDPs is important in an international context as well. Georgia is one of the 
more experienced countries in dealing with IDPs, and although the findings from this study 
are not valid for the international IDP population in general, it is still possible to draw on the 
                                                 
9	  IDMC’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.internal-­‐displacement.org/	  accessed	  06.11.2012 
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experiences that the Georgian IDPs have made. Studying the political mobilization of IDPs 
can also add to our knowledge on how IDPs act during, and after conflict, and it can 
contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms of conflict and why they persist.   
1.5 Theoretical Framework for the Thesis 
Social movement theory is a diverse, interdisciplinary field. Recognizing that several of the 
tools developed by different theorists are valuable to the analysis of the data collected in this 
thesis, I have chosen to create a theoretical synthesis consisting of the main elements from 
three different theoretical directions; Resource Mobilization theory, Collective Behavior 
theory and Relative Deprivation theory.  
1.6 Methodology  
This is a qualitative case study, based primarily on 30 in depth interviews with IDPs and 
experts on IDP issues in Georgia. Informants for this thesis were, in the case of IDPs, selected 
by the “snowball-method”, and in the case of expert informants, selected on the grounds of 
their role, work or expertise. Secondary sources are used throughout the thesis to 
contextualize and verify my own findings. A lot of the available literature on Georgian IDPs 
is produced by NGOs that operate in Georgia. These documents are mostly available online, 
since I refer to these reports quite a lot, I have chosen to do so in the footnotes so as not to 
break up the text. All other references will be given in parenthesis.   
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is organized in two main parts: the theoretical framework used to analyze the 
empirical data will be presented in the following chapter, after which I will give an account of 
the methodological choices made while preparing and conducting this study. I will then give a 
historical account of the events that led up to the displacement, and events that have taken 
place in the aftermath of war. The second section is devoted to the analysis of the data 
collected, followed by a concluding discussion where the theoretical framework will be used 
to shed light on the findings from the analysis. 
 
 7 
2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Studying Political Mobilization 
Social Movement theory is a broad, interdisciplinary field often used to analyze contentious 
politics. Common to all Social Movement theorists is their goal to explain how social 
movements arise and what factors compel people to participate and mobilize politically. The 
three primary directions within social movement theory are; (a) Relative Deprivation Theory, 
which views the collective experience of grievances and a strong group identity as potent 
agents in motivating mobilization (Gurr: 1970); (b) Resource Mobilization theory, which 
focuses on the social movement’s ability to organize, obtain and distribute resources as 
crucial when trying to sustain social movements (Tilly, 1978a); and (c) Political Opportunity 
Structure theory, which sees openings in the political opportunity structure as one of the 
primary reasons for political mobilization (Tarrow, 2011). The different theories diverge 
primarily in what they identify as the key variable to inspire and instigate political 
mobilization, they are also separated by their emphasis on the importance of organization to 
sustain social movements (Flikke, 2006). Efforts have been made to merge the existing 
theories into one comprehensive theoretical framework, although unsuccessfully.  
In my research of social movements in a post-conflict setting, among an understudied 
demographical group, I have found it best to create a broad theoretical synthesis, composed 
by the main elements of the predominant theoretical directions.10 This allows for the inclusion 
of important variables, and potential incidents of political mobilization can be more easily 
intercepted.   
2.2 Relative Deprivation Theory 
The philosophers Karl Marx and Frederick Engels saw mobilization as an inevitable event 
that would occur when the proletariat’s deep discontent with capitalism erupted into a full-
                                                 
10	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  employ	  general	  theories	  on	  social	  movements	  rather	  than	  theories	  on	  refugee	  mobilization	  (see	  for	  example	  Zolberg	  et	  al.	  1986,	  Adelman	  1998),	  these	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  refugees	  as	  warriors	  and	  participants	  in	  conflicts,	  an	  aspect	  not	  relevant	  while	  trying	  to	  identify	  political	  mobilization.	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blown confrontation between the two.11 When the predicted conflict failed to materialize, it 
might have been because Marx and Engels underestimated the significance of common 
identity and overestimated the importance of shared economic interests (Tarrow, 2011:18). 
Gurr and Moore have elaborated on Marxist theory and identified the experience of relative 
deprivation and grievances as powerful motivators for mobilization. According to his theory, 
a group of people who shares a collective experience of deprivation can funnel the shared 
anger into collective action (1997:1097-1103). Relative deprivation is a subjective, perceived 
phenomenon, meaning that the actors might feel deprived, even though objectively they are 
not (Runciman, 1966:9). It is the disparity between what the actors envision for themselves, 
and their actual reality, that creates a sense of dissatisfaction. Gurr defines relative deprivation 
as an:  
[…] actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value 
capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe 
they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are 
capable of getting and keeping (1970:24).  
Values are in turn defined as “the desired events, objects, and conditions for which men 
strive”(Gurr, 1970:26). The more important these values are to a person, the greater discontent 
their absence creates. If there are few alternative ways available to the actors to achieve their 
value expectations, anger and desperation might increase. If actors experience relative 
deprivation over a long period of time, and they are denied the opportunity to express their 
anger towards the situation, the resentment they harbor will increase, and subsequently be 
carried on to the next generation (Gurr, 1970:59).  
Gurr’s theory has been criticized for the failure to explain why not all groups that  
have experienced deprivation mobilize. In an essay from 2011, Gurr maintains his belief in 
grievances as a source of discontent and as an explanatory model for mobilization12. Central 
to Gurr’s theory is the individual. He claims that should be “the prism through which to 
examine the effects of social structures, beliefs, and the possibilities for mobilization and 
political action”(Gurr, 1970:68). In order to understand why people mobilize, it is necessary 
to examine how they understand themselves in relation to their reference group and it’s 
                                                 
11Communist	  Manifesto’s	  website,	  available	  at	  https://webspace.utexas.edu/hcleaver/www/368/368CommunistManifestoPtItable.pdf	  accessed	  06.11.2012	  
12	  e-­‐International	  Relations’	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.e-­‐ir.info/2011/11/17/why-­‐men-­‐rebel-­‐redux-­‐how-­‐valid-­‐are-­‐its-­‐arguments-­‐40-­‐years-­‐on/	  accessed	  09.11.2012	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identity. To understand where grievances come from, it is necessary to examine people’s 
beliefs about their own situation, and look at how they interpret their lives. The key to 
understanding these beliefs does not lie in abstract ideologies, but rather in the study of group 
identity.  
2.2.1 Group Identity  
In “People Vs. State”, Gurr stipulates that one of the factors determining the shape, intensity 
and persistence of collective action is the salience of group identity (2000:66). Gurr defines 
identity as “…enduring social constructions that matter to the people who share them. How 
much they matter depend on people’s social and political circumstances”(2000:8). Group 
identity is essentially based on shared traits; the group creates a space within which people 
who have something in common can come together and cultivate their shared interests. It is 
possible to be a member of a group without it being a defining aspect of one’s life. If, 
however, something should threaten the existence of the group, or the members experience 
relative deprivation, group identity can be a potent agent in mobilizing the members. If the 
identity is based on durable traits, rather than interests, it is likely to be more resilient and thus 
more apt as a starting point for mobilization.  
The salient bases of collective identity include a common language, religion, or national or 
racial origin, shared cultural practices, and attachment to a particular territory. Most […] 
groups also have a common history or myths of shared experience, often of conquest and 
victimization by others (Gurr, 2000:8). 
It is not necessarily one specific trait that creates group identity, but rather a belief that the 
shared trait sets the group apart from the general population (Ibid). Gurr also argues that the 
greater the dissimilarity from the general population, with which the group interacts regularly, 
the more salient their identity is likely to be. Conflicts, with rival groups and/or the state, past 
or ongoing, might also aid the formation of collective identity (Gurr, 2000:68). 
2.2.2 Beyond Identity 
Brubaker and Cooper also see identity as a social construction, but they are skeptical about 
employing the term uncritically. If the researcher uses the term both as a category of practice 
and as a category of analysis, there is a risk of reproducing reifications, meaning that by 
emphasizing and focusing on identity, one might overestimate the importance of the 
phenomenon and see group identity where in reality there is none (Brubaker and Cooper, 
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2000:4). As a category of practice, the term serves the function of allowing people to make 
sense of their world, by creating categories that allows them to separate themselves from 
others. This is unproblematic, however it becomes problematic when the use of the term is 
directly transferred as a category of analysis. If one does not account for how the term will be 
used as an analytical category, one accepts the practical use at face value, thus making it a real 
category (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000:6). By uncritically using the term identity as a category 
of analysis, one presupposes the existence of identity, and thus reinforces it. Brubaker and 
Cooper are especially critical towards employing the term when studying social movements, 
as the term is often used both to explain the basis for collective action, and as a contingent 
product of political actions (2000:8). Thus a need for a more precise vocabulary presents 
itself.  
Verba, Nie and Kim have presented an alternative term: social category. A social 
category is based on shared status, either by gender or other social properties, although this 
term does not necessarily imply the same level of identification between the members, 
meaning that some of them might belong to a social category without identifying with it. If 
they do, however, define their membership of the social category as important to their 
identity, they might have a preference for policies relevant to the social category (Verba, Nie 
and Kim: 1978:12). Political mobilization based on membership in a social category might 
still be potent as group-based mobilization. The difference is that the level of solidarity 
among the members might not be as latent, and mobilization thereby requires a higher level of 
organization. If a high level of organization is attained, the social category has a better chance 
of accessing the political arena (Ibid). Verba, Nie and Kim also emphasize that a group-based 
approach is especially suited for a lower-status group, as they rely on it to participate and 
compete with higher-status groups. If the two are polarized in society, they become social 
categories, as they are inclined to favor policies directed towards their social stratum (Verba, 
Nie & Kim, 1978:14).  
 Tilly sees identity as  
[…]an actor's experience of a category, tie, role, network, group or organization, coupled with 
a public representation of that experience; the public representation often takes the form of a 
shared story, a narrative (1996: 7).  
This definition, a reflection of identity used as a category of practice, allows for the actors to 
define the existence and importance of group identity. Pairing the personal experience of the 
respondents with the public representations of group identity allows the researcher to look at 
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identity as both an internal and external factor for mobilization. Even though the members of 
the group do not perceive their group identity as important, external actors such as the 
government or the public might still categorize people into groups, which in turn can affect 
the treatment the group receives. As this definition allows for both an internal and external 
definition of group identity, I have chosen to employ it in this study.  
2.3 New Social Movement Theory 
2.3.1 Resource Mobilization Theory 
Where Gurr sees relative deprivation and group identity as essential factors for political 
mobilization, resource mobilization theorist Tilly emphasizes interest, organization, 
opportunity and mobilization as basic prerequisites for social movements. Interests are 
defined as goals that are shared by the group, and that are shaped by gains and losses the 
group has experienced when dealing with other groups. They can be inferred either by 
questioning members of the group, or by examining the actions of the group (Tilly, 1978b: 
54). Organization is seen as the structure of the group “that most directly affects its capacity 
to act on its interests” (Ibid: 7). Underlying structures, such as common identity shared by the 
individuals in the population, is important for a higher level of organization. Mobilization is 
the process “by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for 
action”(Tilly, 1978b: 7). Resources are defined as anything that allows for the group to act on 
its interests; coercion, capital and commitment. Coercions is defined as “means such as 
weapons, armed forces…and organized routines for imposing sanctions”(Tilly, 2006:19), i.e. 
allowing the actor to cause loss or damage to opposing actors. Capital refers to concrete 
resources which when employed can lead to an increase in value and claims. Commitment 
refers to relation among the actors, bonds that further empower the relations within the group, 
for example a collective identity (Tilly, 2006:20). The ability to organize and attain a higher 
level of organization is also seen as a resource, as is making resources available, not only to 
an individual, but to the group as a whole. It is important to note that mobilization involves 
collective control over resources, not just accretion of resources:  
An increase of resources within a unit normally facilitates its mobilization, simply by 
permitting subunits to keep receiving resources while the larger unit gains control over more 
than it had before (Tilly, 2006:78).  
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The element of opportunity deals with the relationship between the population’s 
interests and the external world within which they attempt to mobilize (Tilly, 1978b:55). For 
many of the groups attempting to mobilize there might be other groups with similar goals. By 
including the element of opportunity, Tilly takes the interplay between competing movements 
into account. If one movement is successful in its mobilization, at the expense of another 
movement, it will assume more power. An increase in a movement’s political power would in 
this context, mean a favorable outcome when interacting with the government. Similarly, any 
costs to the movement derived from interaction with other groups, leads to a repression of the 
movement (Tilly, 1978:55).  
 All these elements stand in a relationship with each other. For example, the likelihood 
of the group being subjected to repression depends on what sort of interests it represents. 
Also, the likelihood of the group succeeding with collective action is dependent on its power, 
its mobilization, and the current opportunities and threats confronting its interests (Tilly, 
1978b: 55).  Actors are likely to develop new interests as they gain complex and effective 
forms of organization. The new interests can come into conflict with the interests around 
which the group organized and mobilized in the first place (Tilly, 1978b: 57). Mobilization, 
according to Tilly, “identifies the process by which a group goes from being a passive 
collection of individuals to an active participant in public life”(1978b: 69). Groups will 
mobilize if and when they gain control over resources. If there are multiple groups competing 
over the same pool of resources, the group with the highest level of organization, where the 
members are coherent in what they define as their goals and share a cohesive collective 
identity, will most likely acquire the resources (Tilly, 1978b: 71). 
 Mobilization thereby becomes a quest to eliminate, or reduce, competing claims on 
resources, develop an extensive program of interests and solidifying the loyalty and group 
structure among the members (Tilly, 1978b: 73). To mobilize successfully it is necessary to 
execute all these activities at once. Only then can the group“[…] go from being a passive 
collection of individuals to an active participant in public life”(Tilly, 1978b: 69). Making the 
acquired resources available to the members for collective action is highly dependent on 
whether or not the group manages to institutionalize its organization, making it capable to 
connect with other actors and position itself towards its surroundings (Tilly, 1978b: 9). Tilly 
calls this process framing of the social movement (1978b).  
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2.3.2 Repertoire of Contention 
Once organized, the movement employs its Repertoire of Contention, meaning essentially all 
tools available to the group when trying to accomplish a goal, or “the ways that people act 
together in pursuit of shared interests”(Tilly, 1995:41). All political mobilization involves two 
actors, one actor presenting a claim, the claimant, and the actor the claims are directed 
towards, the object of the claims. For example by participating in demonstrations, the 
claimant is presenting its claims in a performance; these types of performances come together 
and form a repertoire of contention (Tilly, 2006:36). This involves all actions available to the 
group, the political maneuvers they know how to conduct, and the actions their circumstances 
might expect them to take (Ibid). The repertoire of contention accessible to any population is 
largely dependent on their history and culture. It is learned behavior that varies with time, 
place and regime. Repertoires draw on the collective identities, social networks and 
organizational forms from everyday life. They are an extension of a shared experience, when 
claimants see what has worked for other claimants previously and then emulate them (Tilly, 
2006:42).  
The type of regime also has an effect on the type of repertoire available to the public,  
By controlling what actions are tolerated in the public sphere[…] by constituting potential 
claimants and potential objects of claims[...]by producing streams of issues, events, and 
governmental actions around which social movements rise and fall (Tilly, 2006:186).  
Similarly, contentious episodes and social movements affect the regime, both gradually and 
spontaneously. If the type of government changes, the movement will acquire new tools 
adjusted to the new form of government. Even though changes occur and new tools are added 
to the repertoire, the old tools and the old repertoire of contention coexists with the new one, 
leading to an enhanced capacity for collective action (Ibid).  
2.3.3 Political Opportunity Structure 
Tarrow, representing the political opportunity structure theorists, argues that social 
movements are created as a response to external influences and incentives (Tarrow, 2011:9). 
According to him, social movements, defined as “collective challenges, based on common 
purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and 
authorities” (Tarrow, 2011:9), arise when an opening in the political opportunity structure is 
created. He defines a political opportunity as “a formal, permanent, or national set of clues 
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that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow, 2011:32). Where Tilly 
focuses on the internal structure and resources available to the movement, Tarrow sees 
mobilization mostly as a product of external factors, primarily on the political arena. 
Movements increase their activity level in response to openings in the political opportunity 
structure, and use these to gain access to the political arena in general. What constitutes an 
opportunity is not defined objectively, but rather by the actors themselves, meaning that it is 
essential that the actors themselves believe that it is possible for them to succeed. Active and 
emotionally engaged individuals who identify an opportunity and are willing to take the risk 
to seize it, inspire others and prove that it is possible to achieve the desired goals by 
mobilizing. This helps the movement to spread and grow.  
Even though collective action can be presented in many forms and shapes; 
institutionalized, disruptive, sustained or brief, most of it occurs outside the framework of 
established institutions. People who lack access to representative institutions often use 
collective action as a tool. They set forth claims that are either new or unaccepted, usually 
targeting the authorities (Tarrow, 2011:7). Contentious politics is at the roots of social 
movements, because they are often the only resource that ordinary people that are contesting 
government policies have access to. Even the apolitical movements might find themselves in 
conflict with the government, since the authorities are responsible for maintaining law and 
order (Calhoun, 1994:21). Contentious collective action is conflicting, because it brings the 
ordinary layman into confrontations with the authorities (Tarrow, 2011:8). This gives social 
movements a very potent element, in that they empower ordinary people to challenge the 
societal norm, produce solidarities and assert themselves outside the fortified arena of general 
politics.  
2.4 Sustaining Mobilization 
The three approaches differ mainly in their view on what it takes to sustain mobilization over 
time, and thereby to become a social movement. Tarrow defines incidents of mobilization as 
contentious episodes, defined as the use of disruptive techniques to prove a political point 
and/or change government policies. To qualify as a social movement, it is necessary to be 
able to sustain a high activity level while confronting a powerful contender13. The key to 
maintaining a high activity level under pressure is social solidarity; the participants must have 
                                                 
13	  For	  more	  on	  this	  argument,	  see	  McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  2001.	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acknowledged their common purpose and goal, and identify with the objectives of the 
movement (Tarrow, 2011:11). If the movement is able to tap into a shared identity, preferably 
based on nation, ethnicity or religion as these have been proven to be more reliable than for 
example class, they are better suited to face their contenders. If they are unable to sustain their 
claim, the movement will evaporate and the members will become isolated.  
 Resource Mobilization theorists focus on organization as a key to maintaining social 
movements over time. As one social movement can be represented by more than one social 
movement organization, they compete for resources (Flikke, 2006:15). Political Opportunity 
Structure theorists sees all interaction within the movement as positive; if one organization is 
active, it lowers the costs of participation for other organizations and inspires further action. 
This in turn increases the resources available to all movements (Flikke, 2006). When an 
organization becomes successful, i.e. affecting the policies and achieving their goals, it often 
becomes a more exclusive organization, because the goal of institutionalizing its power 
becomes more important than being all-encompassing with regards to membership (Flikke, 
2006:16). This may cause friction to erupt among the organizations.  
 Where Political Opportunity Structure focuses on factors external to the social 
movement, Resource Mobilization theory emphasizes the internal processes and the 
movement’s relationship with its members. So where Political Opportunity Structure 
describes the movement’s relations to its surroundings and its position in an institutional 
sphere, the Resource Mobilization theory and Relative Deprivation theory provide a better 
understanding of the internal processes and the societal and cultural aspects of mobilization. 
The theoretical traditions are divided by their focus on internal and external factors that 
influence mobilization (Polletta and Jasper, 2001:283). Including all three traditions allows 
for a more exhaustive and meticulous analysis of political mobilization.  
2.5 Accommodation or Repression 
As the activities and responsibilities of the nation state expanded and comprised increasingly 
larger parts of society in the 19th century, social movements have directed their attention 
towards the governments, “centralizing the targets of collective action” (Tarrow, 2011:85). 
This has also had an integrating effect on social movements, making their demands broader 
and more elaborate, as they were able to hold the government accountable for their welfare. 
The type of regime, autocratic or democratic, has an effect on mobilization in two ways; it 
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determines what type of mobilization that is likely to occur, what repertoire of contention the 
population can employ, and it determines the type of response the movements are likely to 
receive from the government.  
Democratic institutions affect both the diffusion and level of political conflict 
(Zimmermann, 2010). The more advanced and progressive they are, the smaller the chance is 
of a rebellion (Gurr, 2000). Solid and durable democratic states will experience less violent 
political mobilization than autocratic and undemocratic states. States in democratic transition 
often experience a significant increase in political activity and rebellions (Gurr, 2000), and 
this corresponds with Tarrow’s theory on political opportunity structure. When a state is 
under such a fundamental change as a transition to democracy, the political arena is open to 
new actors who will take advantage of this. How the government responds to the mobilization 
will also affect how it develops further.  
2.5.1 Government Responses to Mobilization 
Gurr defines the government’s response as decisive, determining whether or not the 
mobilization becomes violent or turns to more productive ways of mobilization. He claims 
that the governments that meet mobilization with reform rarely get targeted for rebellion. 
However, government-imposed inequalities are often a source of anger and deprivation 
among the public, especially in less democratic states. If ruled by repression and denied the 
right to protest and use democratic ways to let their opinion be heard, people are more likely 
to go underground and employ more unconventional tactics (Gurr, 2011).  
Tilly has developed a dichotomy of political repression and political 
accommodation/facilitation to determine the outcomes of the efforts of social movements. If 
the movement is met with a governmental response of accommodation, it might either be 
institutionalized as part of the political structure, or the movement might dissolve, having 
achieved what it set out to. If the movement is repressed, it might grow stronger in its intent to 
succeed, take even more drastic measures, or dissolve (Tilly, 1978a: 100).  
Tarrow has developed this dichotomy further and established three sets of potential 
outcomes: he has categorized the potential outcomes of political mobilization into three 
categories: exhaustion and polarization, facilitation and institutionalization, or violence and 
repression (Tarrow, 2011:147-149). Exhaustion and polarization often occur when the 
movement has been unable to achieve results for a longer period of time. The members in the 
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periphery of the movement will most likely be the first to stop participating. As social 
movements are often dependent on a substantial number of members to be powerful, the 
individuals at the core of the movement might panic at the loss of members and radicalize the 
contention in response (Tarrow, 2011). This leads to a polarization between the members who 
are willing to compromise and seek a peaceful resolution with the government on the one 
hand, and those who seek conflict with the government on the other.   
 Facilitation and institutionalization occur when the movement moves away from 
radical and disruptive forms of contention, and seeks to compromise with the government, 
maybe to retain the support of their members. Institutionalization might also involve the 
movement taking on a more official form, for example as a political party. Facilitation from 
the government might come in the shape of a political reform; however, reforms seldom 
satisfy all the demands of the social movements, as these tend to be too radical to 
accommodate (Tarrow, 2011).  
 Repression is traditionally used by authoritarian regimes in response to contentious 
politics. They can use violence and imprisonment to confine the movements and effectively 
put a stop to their activities. If the acts of repression are arbitrary, it is likely that the 
movement will become radicalized, angered by the unjust acts of repression. In democratic 
societies selective facilitation and selective repression is more common. These governments 
can encourage moderation, and is able to fend off the most radical segments of the social 
movements (Tarrow, 2011).  
2.5.2 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has outlined three theoretical directions that all relate to the phenomenon of 
political mobilization. By utilizing aspects from several theories I have created an analytical 
toolbox with the necessary tools to analyze political mobilization amongst Georgian IDPs. I 
have included Gurr’s theory on Relative Deprivation as it is highly relevant for the analysis of 
political mobilization amongst Georgian IDPs. The IDPs are united by their shared experience 
of deprivation, meaning that the reason they form a group is based on their experience of 
displacement. Whether or not they are able to use the deprivation as motivation to mobilize 
depends on the level of collective identity. A strong collective identity provides fertile 
grounds for mobilization, as it produces solidarity and loyalty between the members. If they 
do not share a collective identity, but rather are defined as a social category, the IDPs will 
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need a higher level of organization to be able to sustain mobilization over time. I have 
included both Resource Mobilization theory and the theory of Political Opportunity Structure 
because it is important to examine both the internal and external factors that influence 
political mobilization. By taking a look at the inner dynamics of the IDP movement as well as 
how they relate to and are influenced by, their surroundings, I am able to present the reader 
with a more comprehensive insight into the dynamics of political mobilization of Georgian 
IDPs.  
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3 Methodology 
In the following chapter I will present the methodological framework used to gather data for 
this thesis.  
3.1 Research Design 
Even though I had insight into the current situation for Georgian IDPs with regards to housing 
and employment, I knew very little about their role in Georgian politics. As there was little 
available research on the subject, this thesis had to be exploratory and inductive in its nature. 
Knowing little of what I could expect in the field I needed a methodological framework that 
allowed for changes to be made along the way. The flexibility offered by qualitative 
methodology made it the better choice. I then decided to do a case study, since my primary 
goal was for the thesis to present the reader with a hermeneutical understanding of the subject, 
meaning that the rationality and reality of the respondents is conveyed without any cultural 
biases interfering on my behalf.  
The choice of doing a case study allowed me to gather information from several 
different types of respondents through in-depth interviews, which in turn allowed me to see 
the subject at hand from different points of view. I have primarily based this thesis on data 
gathered through these in-depth qualitative interviews. To contextualize my own findings, and 
to verify some of the information given by my informants, I have used secondary sources. 
Some of these were written with a political or humanitarian agenda. I have chosen to 
disregard the lack of objectivity, because they serve as an excellent illustration of the 
sentiments and animosities that have been part of the conflict from the beginning. When such 
sources are used I have listed it in the footnotes.   
Robert Yin defines case studies as the best choice when the goal of the study is to 
conduct: 
[…] an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 2009:18).  
The negative aspect of conducting a case study is the lack of opportunity to generalize the 
results back to a larger universe of units. It should therefore be mentioned that I do not claim 
these findings to be valid or applicable to all IDP populations. The findings of this exploratory 
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study might still offer some valuable insights into the specific context at hand, and they might 
say something about the general situation for Georgian IDPs today. Even though I started 
with a clear perception of what I wanted to research, I gained a lot of knowledge while 
preparing for my fieldwork, and thus the idea has developed through all stages of the research 
process (Thagaard, 2009). I did a review of relevant literature, developed the research 
question, familiarized myself with existing theories on political mobilization and social 
movements, and used the operationalization of the central terms and concepts as a reference 
for developing my interview guide.  
Conducting a case study requires a high level of thoroughness and stringent analysis 
on behalf of the researcher, and it is important not to mix ones own cultural bias and 
preconceived notions into the analysis. Upon arrival in Georgia I conducted a short group 
interview with Georgians employed in the NGO sector. During these interviews I went over 
the operationalizations of the main terms, and the interview guide. This was done to give me 
an impression of what content of meaning the respondents would ascribe the different terms, 
and to ensure the validity of the terms used, and to correct for any preconceived notions on 
my behalf. I also checked to see if any of the questions could be perceived as offensive or 
intrusive. It proved to be very useful, as some of the operationalizations had to be elaborated 
on and clarified.  
 I then proceeded to alter my interview guide so that it corresponded with the new 
information. While working on the interview guide I systematized the questions in categories 
connected to mobilization. This made it easier to ensure that all topics were touched upon 
during the interviews (Repstad, 2007:78). This alteration of the interview guide also provided 
me with a second chance to correct my own preconceived notions of political mobilization. 
3.2 Qualitative Interviews 
Interviewing is one of the most frequently used approaches in qualitative methods (Thagaard, 
2009), and it is also the approach I have chosen to use for my fieldwork. I conducted in-depth 
interviews with both IDPs and experts on IDP issues, and this was done so as to balance out 
any potential interests the respondents might have in altering their answers to influence the 
results (Repstad, 2007:81). A complete list of respondents is given in the appendix. I 
employed two different principles of selection when choosing informants. To find IDPs 
willing to be interviewed I used the snowball-principle (Repstad, 2007:57). By identifying 
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one informant and letting her guide me to the next, I was able to reach people I would 
otherwise not have found. This method of selecting informants also ensures a very central 
principle; participation based on voluntary and informed consent (Dalland, 2000:223). The 
drawback of interviewing people from the same network is that it might involve a loss of 
diversity in the answers given. I have corrected for this by interviewing respondents from 
different locations. I conducted interviews in the cities of Poti, Zugdidi and Tbilisi. Since the 
IDPs live mainly in Tbilisi and in the Samegrelo region it was necessary to conduct 
interviews in both places. My former experience dictated that the living conditions and level 
of employment could be very different from region to region, so it was therefore important to 
conduct interviews in both a rural and an urban setting. I did ten interviews with IDPs in Poti, 
and ten interviews with IDPs living in Tbilisi.  
 Selecting expert respondents for this research was a challenge because there are many 
actors operating in Georgia who claim to represent or work with IDP issues. I therefore 
contacted the institutionalized, formal organizations representing IDPs first, such as the exile 
government and the MRA. Respondents from these organizations needed to be interviewed 
because they represent IDP interests in the governmental structure of Georgia. To access 
experts on IDP issues that were not part of the formal structure, I asked the IDPs who they felt 
best represented their interests, and then contacted these persons for interviews. The IDPs led 
me to NGO representatives, community leaders (Mama Saxlisis), and academics who have 
participated in the public debate on IDP issues.  
I also made sure the respondents knew what the information would be used for and 
that they could withdraw from the interview at any time (Repstad, 2007). Many of the IDPs 
avoided or refused to answer some questions that they felt were too sensitive. This made 
gathering information on those topics difficult. I therefore included some IDPs who worked in 
the NGO sector. These persons are listed as IDPs in the overview of respondents, but could 
comment on the issues both as IDPs and as professionals. This made it easier to talk about 
sensitive issues in a less personal way, and I felt that the information given was both accurate 
and sincere.  
The interviews with the IDPs were conducted in their homes, and I conducted some of 
them during the day and some in the evening. This was done purposely because the women 
are often at home with the children during the day, and I wanted to make sure that I had 
access to their point of view as well. It proved beneficial to conduct interviews in the homes 
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of the respondents, as I got the impression that they were not afraid to be outspoken about 
their opinions in this setting. The downside of conducting interviews in their homes was that 
as many of the interviews with IDPs were not scheduled beforehand, they might have felt my 
presence to be a bit intrusive, and some might have been eager to end the interview. 
Interviews with experts were either conducted in their office or at a café. As these respondents 
had training in dealing with the media and are accustomed to speaking in public, they were 
often longer and more elaborate than the interviews conducted with the IDPs. Some of the 
expert respondents were also quite skilled in avoiding uncomfortable subjects, which 
oftentimes led to me having to ask the same questions more than once. Altogether I 
interviewed thirty respondents, twenty IDPs and ten experts. I decided on the number of 
interviews by using the principle of saturation, meaning that when I started to get the same 
information from different respondents I decided to stop interviewing (Thagaard, 2009). 
I prepared only one interview guide, but tailored it to the respondent when I was 
interviewing experts such as government officials or NGO representatives. Some of the 
interviews were conducted in English, some in Russian and some in Georgian using a 
certified interpreter. The interviews conducted with an interpreter were a bit difficult because 
I had no way of knowing for sure that the interpreter was translating my exact questions. I 
was accustomed to talking to people via an interpreter during my internship in DRC, and I felt 
I had control over the potential pitfalls. Using an interpreter challenges the linguistic 
equivalence, but I tried to prevent misunderstandings by explaining and giving examples of 
what I meant by the different terms before the interview started or as we went along.  
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The information gathered during the interviews will 
primarily be presented in the analysis as quotes, and I 
have juxtaposed quotes from different respondents to 
illustrate the variety of perceptions and opinions of the 
respondents. It is important to underline that the information gathered from the IDPs is not 
representative for all IDPs, but that it serves as indications of prevalent sentiments among the 
IDP population. The expert respondents’ statements reflect the opinions of the person 
interviewed, and some of them are anonymous because they specifically asked to be. This 
applies to the representative from the exile government, the representatives from the MRA 
and some of the NGO representatives.  
 
 
Group discussion in Abasha. The 
people in the picture were not 
interviewed for this thesis. 
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3.3 Recording and Transcribing 
I recorded the interviews where permission was given to do so. The informants were assured 
that the information gathered would not be used for any other purpose than this thesis, and 
they were also informed that the recordings would be deleted when the thesis had been 
completed. I have only used the recordings while transcribing the interviews. The benefits of 
using a tape recorder are that it strengthens the reliability of the data and that all the quotes are 
ad verbum the words of the respondents.  
3.4 Positionality 
The researcher’s position has the potential to affect the results of the analysis. External 
characteristics and associations might be crucial to how the respondent perceives the 
interviewer. I tried to be careful not to be associated with DRC when I was in the field, but at 
times it was not possible because I used an interpreter from this organization. This might have 
led to the respondent thinking that they might gain something from being interviewed, as 
DRC is a powerful NGO in Georgia, especially in the Samegrelo region. However, I carefully 
explained that this was not the case and that I just represented myself.  
Finally, I strived to create a comfortable and relaxed atmosphere, especially while 
interviewing IDPs. I was acutely aware that I as the interviewer defined and controlled the 
situation in that I introduced the topic of conversation and asked, sometimes critical, follow-
up questions. I therefore began each interview with the IDPs with questions about their 
personal history and their daily lives in displacement. I found that this initial conversation 
proved that I took them seriously and that I was interested in creating attention towards their 
situation. Being able to convey that I had their best interest at heart was important both for me 
personally, as I felt it made the situation less intrusive, and it helped kick start the interview. 
Already having spent a considerable amount of time in Georgia I was already familiar with 
the culture and was able to navigate the social norms with ease, this proved to be of value as I 
think it made both me and the respondents more comfortable with the situation.
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4 Historical Background 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight important political and historical events that might have 
had an influence on the political lives of IDPs in Georgia. Events that have altered the 
political system and situation in Georgia will also be included to provide a better 
understanding of the present situation. An historical account of the last twenty years 
necessarily implies some simplification, but I have tried to focus on those events that are most 
important to the subject at hand. Completely neutral and objective literature is difficult to 
come by when researching the history of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, but by presenting 
sources from both camps a balanced overview can be achieved.  
4.1 Geography and Ethnic Diversity in Abkhazia 
It is important to understand the geographical context, because in “the Caucasus, history starts 
with geography” (Zürcher, 2007:12). Abkhazia is situated northwest in Georgia, on the coast of 
the Black Sea south of the Russian border. The Ingur/Enguri River14 separates Abkhazia from 
Georgia proper, coinciding roughly with the de facto border. The capital of Abkhazia is 
Sukhum/Sokhumi, situated 73 km north of the de facto border. Since the war in 2008, when 
the Abkhaz annexed the Kodor/i Gorge, the territory of Abkhazia has largely coincided with 
the territory of the former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia (ASSR) (Trier, 
Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:7). The Abkhaz republic is named after the Abkhaz people, but has 
been, and still is, populated by several different nationalities. A Soviet census, conducted in 
1989, showed that out of Abkhazia’s 525,000 inhabitants 45,7% were Georgians 15, 14,3% 
Russians, 17,3% Abkhaz and 14,6% Armenians (Zürcher, 2007:117)16. The number of 
Georgians residing in Abkhazia has varied throughout the twentieth century, but was 
significantly reduced during the 1990s as a consequence of the war.   
                                                 14	  Almost	  all	  names	  have	  a	  Georgian	  and	  an	  Abkhaz	  equivalent.	  As	  the	  spelling	  is	  very	  important	  to	  the	  protagonists	  and	  signifies	  a	  political	  standpoint,	  I	  will	  write	  both	  forms.	   15	  The	  percentage	  of	  Georgians	  living	  in	  Abkhazia	  was	  not	  always	  high;	  from	  1914	  to	  1989	  the	  number	  of	  Georgians	  went	  from	  28%	  to	  45.5%.	  The	  increase	  was	  caused	  by	  Stalin’s	  policy	  of	  resettling	  Georgians	  to	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  Georgia.	  	  This	  heightened	  the	  competition	  over	  scarce	  land	  and	  increased	  the	  animosity	  felt	  by	  the	  different	  groups.	  After	  1978	  reverse	  Soviet	  policy	  strengthened	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  Abkhaz	  and	  reversed	  many	  of	  the	  discriminatory	  practices.	   16	  The	  numbers	  might	  not	  be	  100%	  accurate,	  as	  the	  data	  could	  have	  been	  manipulated.	  The	  figures	  therefore	  need	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  caution.  
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The Georgians who were displaced belong to the ethnic group Megrelians. This ethnic 
group is differentiated from the general population primarily by their language, Megrelian, a 
language without a literary standard, used largely as a vernacular within families and between 
friends (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:52). It is not common in Georgia to look at 
Megrelian as a separate ethnic identity, and it is often underlined that the Megrelians are 
Georgian, their regional identity is thus inextricably related to the national identity (Ibid: 53). 
Megrelians primarily live in the western part of Georgia, more specifically in the district of 
Zemo Svaneti-Samegrelo, south of the de facto border. The IDPs are now spread all over the 
country, but the majority resides in the capital and in the Samegrelo region17. 
 The Abkhaz form an ethnic group on the territory of Abkhazia ,with a population of 
around 216,000 according to a census conducted in 200318. The Abkhaz language is a 
Northwest Caucasian tongue, and they use the Cyrillic alphabet. Russian and Abkhazian are 
the two official languages of Abkhazia, but recent laws have mandated an increase in the 
usage of Abkhaz in public and governmental documents19. About 75% of the Abkhaz 
population is Orthodox Christians, and the Orthodox Church of Abkhazia is administered by 
the Eparchy of Abkhazia. Around 10% are Sunni Muslim20.  
4.2 Foundations for Conflict 
A renaissance of national projects occurred in the member states of the Soviet Union when 
the policies of glasnost’ and perestroika were launched in 1985 and 1987. Reestablishing a 
national identity and consolidating territorial integrity became a top priority for several of the 
member states when these issues were allowed to resurface in the increasingly open political 
climate. However, the member states were not the only ones trying to reestablish themselves; 
                                                 17	  Master	  Thesis	  by	  Bobby	  Svitzer	  at	  Malmö	  university,	  available	  at	  http://dspace.mah.se:8080/bitstream/handle/2043/14250/Thesis%20final%20version.pdf?sequence=2	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  18	  The	  Republic	  of	  Abkhazia’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.therepublicofabkhazia.org/pages/who-­‐we-­‐are/population.shtml	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  19	  The	  Republic	  of	  Abkhazia’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.therepublicofabkhazia.org/pages/who-­‐we-­‐are/population.shtml	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  20The	  Republic	  of	  Abkhazia’s	  website,	  available	  at	  	  http://www.therepublicofabkhazia.org/pages/who-­‐we-­‐are/religions.shtml	  accessed	  09.11.2012	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the Soviet policy of national delimitation, developed by Lenin, had created several sub-state 
level entities that were given different levels of autonomy in the Soviet hierarchy.  
The right of all the nations forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent states 
must be recognised. To deny them this right, or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its 
practical realisation, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure or annexation21.  
The Soviet ideology viewed ethnic groups as nations with a right to an autonomous separate 
political unit within a Soviet republic. This primordial view, regarding nations as nascent, also 
implied that the nations could demise and die without the security that autonomy represented 
(Zürcher, 2007:37). This constituted a threat that in turn lent urgency to the claims of 
independence set forth by the different sub-state entities. Delegating autonomy to these 
entities worked well within the framework of the Soviet Union, as the sub-state entities were 
able to co-exist with the Republics through treaty-based relations. When the Soviet Union fell 
it became clear that the Soviet policy of national delimitation had created fertile soil for 
conflict between the autonomous regions and the republics.  
 This was also true for Abkhazia, the region had been granted status as a separate 
Soviet republic in 1922, but was reduced to an Autonomous Republic within Georgia (the 
ASSR) in 193122. The ethnic Abkhaz were regarded as the titular nationality of Abkhazia, 
even though they were not in majority. Relevant to the notion of homeland was the 
understanding that the local nomenklatura should somehow represent the titular nationality of 
the “homeland (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:21).  The status of titular nationality implied 
that the majority of members in the party apparatus in Abkhazia were Abkhaz. When the 
Union fell the Abkhaz found themselves outnumbered by Georgians, partly because the 
Soviet authorities from 1937 to 1953, had resettled Georgians to the southernmost region of 
Abkhazia, Gal/i, oftentimes against their will23. The Soviet understanding of the nation, 
instilled in both Abkhaz and Georgians, implied that the loss of autonomy would essentially 
mean the demise of their nation (Tishkov, 1999). This underlying threat led to the domination 
of ethno-nationalist sentiments in the Abkhazian state building project (Trier, Lohm and 
                                                 
21 Marxist’s website, available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/7thconf/29e.htm accessed 09.11.2012 
22 The Republic of Abkhazia’s website, available at 
http://www.therepublicofabkhazia.org/pages/road-to-independence/timeline.shtml accessed 
09.11.2012 
23 The Republic of Abkhazia’s website, available at 
http://www.therepublicofabkhazia.org/pages/road-to-independence/timeline.shtml accessed 
09.11.2012	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Szakonyi, 2010). The fear of losing their autonomy, culture, and language convinced the 
Abkhaz that they needed to keep the demographical balance in their favor, as and maintain 
control politically.  
The discourse in the early 1990s revolved primarily around each side trying to 
establish their ethno-genesis on the lands of Abkhazia, under the assumption that the side that 
could prove that they were the true heir to Abkhazia should control the political destiny of the 
region (Trier, Lohm & Szakonyi, 2010:19).   
The escalation of tension between Georgians and Abkhaz in the 1980s, the outbreak of war 
with the Georgians, and the experiences of the post-war years have all served to exacerbate 
Abkhaz fears- already nurtured at the beginning of the twentieth century and intensified during 
the Stalin period-of what many Abkhazians perceive as a concerted policy by Georgians to 
assimilate them and make them a minority in their homeland (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 
2010:9).  
The Abkhaz were not alone in employing nationalistic rhetoric to corroborate their goals. 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Megrelian writer, was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council of 
the Republic of Georgia in 1990 under the slogan “Georgia for Georgians”. He had played a 
central role in organizing demonstrations for the secession from the Soviet Union, one of 
which came to play an important part in the secession as Georgia’s “selected trauma”: on 
April 9th, 1989, a peaceful demonstration against the Soviet rule was held in Tbilisi, leading to 
the Soviet forces brutally breaking up the event. Many were injured and some 20 people 
killed24. The consequences were an increase in anti-Soviet sentiments in the Georgian 
population and an increase in the tensions between Abkhazia and Georgia. On April 9th, 1991, 
exactly two years after the Soviet massacre, the Georgian parliament passed a declaration of 
independence.  Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected president in May of the same year.  
4.3 Three Wars 
The now independent state and aspiring democracy of Georgia experienced severe problems 
after the secession. The nationalistic sentiment present both in Georgia proper and in the 
breakaway regions manifested itself in hostile incidents, eventually leading to a full-scale war. 
In a four-year period three separate wars took place, overlapping each other in time. The first 
war started in South Ossetia in November 1989, escalated in January 1991 and reached its 
                                                 24	  Alexander	  Mikaberidze’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://rustaveli.tripod.com/9aprili.html	  accessed	  09.11.2012	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most hostile phase in June 1992. The second war started in December 1991 and was fought 
between rivaling Georgian groups trying to establish their political power in Tbilisi. It 
culminated in the ousting of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in a coup d’état in 1992, leaving 
the country to be ruled by a military council consisting of leaders from the opposition, 
defectors from the Gamsakhurdia camp and various paramilitary forces. The third war was 
fought over Abkhazia’s independence; it started in August 1992 and ended in September 1993 
with the withdrawal of Georgian forces. Together the three wars cost up to 13,000 lives, 
wounded 8,000 and uprooted as many as 300,000 and left the country in a state of utter chaos 
(Zürcher, 2007:116). Almost the entire Georgian population of Abkhazia, approximately 
240,000 persons, was displaced (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:17).  
 The Abkhaz victory was largely made possible by the fact that they already had their 
own autonomy and that they were equipped with political institutions and national symbols 
that facilitated mobilization and secession. As the Abkhaz were considered to be the titular 
nationality of Abkhazia, they were overrepresented in the political elite and had access to 
economic resources that could fuel into the fight for independence (Zürcher, 2007).  
4.4 Post Conflict Georgia 
The three wars devastated those affected, but the war in Abkhazia had one particular 
consequence; it forced 240,000 ethnic Georgians (mostly Megrelians) to flee from Abkhazia 
to Georgia proper. After the war the fragile peace was partially maintained by the Russian 
presence. Russia brokered a cease-fire agreement, also known as the Moscow agreement, 
between Abkhazia and Georgia in 1994, where the two parties agreed to cease the use of 
force. UN observers were placed on both sides of the de facto border, and Georgia agreed to 
join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Zürcher, 2007). Russian forces were 
deployed as peacekeeping forces with a mandate from the CIS to four military bases in 
Georgia.  
 Georgian statehood was largely unconsolidated after the three wars. The anti-Soviet 
movement, run by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, had demolished what was left of the Soviet 
institutions, and the political transition from communism was quickly turning Georgia into a 
failed state. The new Georgian elite was not powerful enough to consolidate statehood or to 
unite the national movement, and as a result paramilitary forces emerged (Zürcher, 2007:148). 
Two of these groups dominated Georgia until 1993; The National Guard and the Mkhedrioni 
30 
(Zürcher, 2007: 226). Together these two criminal groupings formed a Military Council. In 
December 1991 they cooperated to oust Gamsakhurdia from power, forcing him to flee the 
country in January 199225.  
4.5 Shevardnadze Becomes President 
The Military Council invited former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, back from Moscow to chair the State Council in March 1992. Elections were 
held shortly thereafter and Shevardnadze was elected, as the only candidate, to the position of 
Chairman of Parliament26. He established a firm rule and managed to consolidate his power 
and marginalize the military council. By the time of the second election in 1995 his party 
“The Citizens’ Union of Georgia” (CUG) had become the ruling party.  
Economic clans and elite groups created political parties to work for their own goals. 
The fact that the various parties did not reflect any real currents in the population meant that 
control over the administrative resources such as the bureaucracy became extremely 
important, as they represented the only guarantee to maintain power. In 1999 new 
parliamentary elections were held. CUG won again with 41.47% of the votes27. In the 
presidential elections in 2000, Shevardnadze won with 79% of the votes28.  
 The Shevardnadze administration strongly supported the Abkhaz Government-
in-Exile, which had been transferred to Georgia after the conflict, as the primary 
representative for IDP issues.  
The Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia aka the Abkhaz Government-in-
Exile was established after the 1993 expulsion of Georgians from Abkhazia. Initially it was 
made up largely of ethnic Georgian government officials, who had fled from 
Sukhum/Sokhumi (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010: 31).  
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  The	  National	  Encyclopedia’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Georgia-­‐HISTORY.html#b	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  26	  The	  National	  Encyclopedia’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Georgia-­‐HISTORY.html#b	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  27	  OSCE’s	  website,	  available	  at	  	  http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/15612	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  28	  OSCE’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/15579	  accessed	  09.11.2012 
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Their vocal leadership was used by Shevardnadze to put pressure on the Abkhaz de facto 
authorities. Many of the IDPs rejected the military stance taken by the Government-in-Exile, 
but they had few other organizations representing them in the public discourse. 
Shevardnadze’s strategy towards the IDP issue was to maintain status quo, keeping the IDPs 
under the illusion that return to Abkhazia was right around the corner, and constantly pushing 
the deadline. But there was taken little concrete action to keep this promise29.  
In 1999 Shevardnadze moved to reduce the importance of the role of the Government-
in-Exile by cutting down the number of employees and funding to the organ. He then initiated 
a policy of temporary integration, meaning that the NGOs working within Georgia were 
allowed to help the IDPs, but not to give aid that could be considered permanent, such as 
durable housing solutions. Temporary integration, an oxymoron, was executed as a 
compromise between the government and the NGOs. The Shevardnadze administration was 
afraid that pursuing integration would be perceived as moving away from the goal of return 
(Matveeva, 2005:17). Deputies of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia represented the IDPs in 
Parliament under the Shevardnadze administration. They were elected before the secession 
from the Soviet Union and remained in parliament as new elections could not take place. 
Known for being a vocal and radical group, they focused specifically on return (Ibid: 19). The 
Saakashvili administration removed the MPs who represented IDPs, and the interests of IDPs 
are now represented through the majoritarian system. This led to the loss of representation of 
IDP interests in parliament (Ibid).  
4.5.1 Fighting Erupts Anew 
Fighting erupted again in the Gal/i region in May 1998, Georgian paramilitary groups 
attacked the Abkhaz army, which in turn lost control of the Gal/i region. The hostilities lasted 
for six days and resulted in Abkhaz victory over the Georgian guerillas. President 
Shevardnadze did not deploy Georgian military forces30. 35-40,000 Georgians were forced to 
flee their homes in Gal/i; the majority of them displaced for the second time in five years 
(Matveeva, 2005:35). The short war also led to the destruction of 1,500 houses, set on fire by 
                                                 29	  Dr.	  Anna	  Matveeva,	  2005	  “New	  Approach	  to	  IDP	  assistance”,	  IDMC’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.internal-­‐displacement.org/8025708F004BC2FE/postSearch?createdocument	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  Page	  14-­‐15	  30	  Le	  Monde	  Diplomatique’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/10georgia	  accessed	  09.11.2012 
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the Abkhaz. Many of the IDPs who were displaced from the Gal/i region were allowed to 
return soon after the incident, but those displaced from other parts of Abkhazia were not able 
to go back31. 
4.6 The Rose Revolution 
Even though the Presidential committee under Shevardnadze had control over the 
administrative resources, it did not impose any restrictions on the media. This led to the 
emergence of many free media channels and NGOs. The TV channel Rustavi-2 became 
especially influential as they gave voice to the opposition, led by Mikheil Saakashvili. He was 
born in Tbilisi and got his law degree in the US, and at the time of the parliamentary elections 
in 2003 he had become the young energetic face of the opposition32. As Minister of Justice 
under the Shevardnadze administration from 2000, he implemented strong reforms against 
corruption in Georgia. When the parliamentary elections of 2003 were deemed to be; 
characterized by a clear lack of political will by the governmental authorities to organize a 
genuine democratic election process, resulting in widespread and systematic election fraud33 
by OSCE, Saakashvili and a united opposition rejected the results of the election and 
demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation from the presidential office34. The opposition was 
strong, united and well organized, and as they now could reach people via television, they 
were also popular in many areas of the country. Shevardnadze still had control over the 
administrative resources, but he did not enjoy the same level of popularity as before. The day 
before the election, Rustavi-2 published a poll where the majority of the votes would go to the 
opposition. The discrepancy between the poll and the official election results made it clear 
that Shevardnadze had opted for fraud and that the numbers in his favor were inflated. This 
led to mass protests in Tbilisi, and to the oppositions’ occupation of Parliament. 
Shevardnadze was forced to resign. The absence of violence and the symbolic use of roses 
throughout the revolution led it to be called “The Rose Revolution”.  
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New Presidential elections were held in January 2004, and Mikheil Saakashvili, from 
the National Movement, won with 96 percent of the votes. His charter focused primarily on 
reuniting the breakaway regions with Georgia proper, fighting for the return of the IDPs, and 
abolishing corruption. In addition to this he took a clear stand against Russia, and wanted 
Georgia to move to the West by gaining membership in NATO and the EU35. 
In Abkhazia the new Georgian leadership has been perceived as erratic. The expressed 
wish to join NATO has reinforced the Abkhaz perception that Georgia is preparing to invade 
Abkhazia (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:9). The military resources available to the 
Abkhaz are insignificant compared to what Georgia has control over, which might have 
contributed to Abkhazia establishing closer ties to Russia (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 
2010:10). Russia considers Abkhazia to be part of its “near-abroad” territory, and it is 
perceived to be of vital importance for the Russian Federation ((Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 
2010: 14). This does not necessarily mean that the Abkhaz are comfortable with the Russian 
embrace, as it might represent a risk of assimilation and annexation; their tolerance of Russia 
is more based on their isolation and their economic and military dependency on Russia (Trier, 
Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:14).  
After the hostilities in the early 1990s the relationship between Georgia and its break-
away regions were characterized by the lack of explicit hostilities, apart from the six days of 
war in May 1998, but also by an absence of peace. In 1996 the CIS imposed sanctions on 
Abkhazia, including a full trade embargo, making it difficult for the people remaining in 
Abkhazia to survive (Zürcher, 2007:8). Illegal trade with agricultural goods became the 
primary income for many Abkhaz people. When Vladimir Putin became president of Russia 
in 2000, he lifted the policies of isolation towards both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By 2002 
investments began flowing into Abkhazia from Russia (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:8). 
In July 2002 Russian passports were offered to 150,000 residents of Abkhazia, (Ibid). In 2006 
Russia initiated an economic embargo against Georgia, stopping all imports of Georgian wine 
and other merchandises (Königs, 2007).  
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4.7 Five Days in August 
A number of events lead to an increase in tension between Russia and Georgia and 
culminated in the 2008 war. A natural starting point is February 2008, when Kosovo declared 
its independence. In response, President Putin stated that the western states’ recognition of 
Kosovo set precedence for the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In March Russia 
announced its withdrawal from the 1996 CIS treaty that banned economic, financial and other 
links with Abkhazia. In continuation of this, in a presidential decree from April 16th instructed 
the Russian government and regions to open political, social and economic ties to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. This was interpreted in Tbilisi as a move from Russia to annex the two 
regions. On June 7th Georgia reported that Russian aircrafts were observed in Georgian 
airspace over South Ossetia. The tension increased in South Ossetia on August 1st and 2nd, 
when there were reported casualties on both sides as a consequence of shelling and sniper 
attacks36.  
 In the evening of August 7th the hostilities escalated into full-blown war as Russian 
forces invaded Georgia. Georgian forces entered South Ossetia, but were on forced out by 
Russian forces on August 8th. On August 9th Russian forces bombed the Black Sea port in Poti 
and the towns of Senaki and Gori. In the evening a second front was opened in Abkhazia by 
the Abkhaz, they attacked the Georgian controlled Kodor/i Gorge. Russia employed 10,000 
new troops in both Gori and Zugdidi, and on August 10th the Russian military was able to take 
control over the highway that connects east and west Georgia. However, on August 12th the 
two parties agreed to sign a peace treaty that involved the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Georgian soil37. The 2008 war led to an increase in Georgia’s IDP population, as 26,000 
people were displaced from South Ossetia. With the aid of western donors the Georgian 
government was able to accommodate these IDPs in a speedy manner by building cottages for 
them close to the de facto border to South Ossetia38.  
Even though the focal point of the war was South Ossetia, it still had a spillover effect 
on Abkhazia. Abkhazia declared a military mobilization on the 10th of August 2008 to drive 
back the 1,000 Georgian troops that were situated in the Kodor/i Valley. Clashes then 
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continued to occur in this area until the 13th of August, when Georgian troops withdrew, along 
with around 1,500 civilians39. This time around, the number of casualties was low, but the 
renewed conflict forced many of the IDPs who had already returned into renewed 
displacement. The war also effectively stopped any new large-scale return of the displaced 
(Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2009).  
4.8 Georgia’s Way Forward 
Georgia faces challenges, not only with regards to Russia and the breakaway regions, but also 
domestically. The Rose Revolution sprang out of a wish for a democratic Georgia, but has the 
Saakashvili administration been able to create it? According to Freedom House, Georgia 
ranked as Partly Free in 2012, and was given a score of 4 on a scale from 1-7 where 7 is the 
least free. It became less democratic in 2008 than it was in 1999-200040. Regardless of the 
reduction in democracy level, the Saakashvili administration has certainly managed to reduce 
levels of corruption, primarily by conducting a large-scale police reform. The majority of the 
police force in Georgia was replaced, resulting in a visible reduction of street crime41. 
Massive popular support in the years immediately following the Rose Revolution enabled the 
reform, but as the years have passed the population of Georgia is no longer unequivocally 
supporting the energetic reformer. The parliamentary elections in 2012 were characterized by 
OSCE as marking a significant step towards consolidating democracy in Georgia42. They also 
marked the first democratic transition of power in Georgia, as Bidzina Ivanishvili, 
representing the coalition of the “Georgian Dream”, was elected Prime Minister. That said 
there are still structural problems that lead to an unbalanced system of governance. This 
system is characterized by the dominance of the executive branch, which in turn is dangerous 
when paired with the restricted freedom of the media43.  
 With regards to the IDPs the Saakashvili administration has implemented several 
reforms. The Georgian government succumbed to the pressure from the international 
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community present in Georgia, largely represented by NGOs, and moved away from the 
policy of temporary integration and thereby focusing on the permanent integration of 
Georgian IDPs. A detailed account of the measures taken to this end will be presented in 
chapter 5.  
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5 Preconditions for Mobilization 
This chapter presents an account of the Georgian IDPs’ present situation. The policies on IDP 
issues developed by the Georgian authorities will be presented, and contrasted to an empirical 
description of the factors the policies aim to improve. Together with the previous chapter it 
aims to provide the reader with a broad understanding of the IDPs’ basis for political 
mobilization, and a nuanced insight into the political landscape in which the IDPs are 
navigating. I will use the three main documents developed by Georgian authorities on the 
rights of IDPs together with the guiding principles on IDPs developed by the UN as 
framework for presenting the main challenges and goals of Georgian IDPs.  
5.1 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
The most significant document developed for the Internally Displaced is the Guiding 
Principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 199844. They describe what 
the IDPs are entitled to immediately after displacement, their rights while in displacement and 
how the host state can arrange a dignified return, if possible. The principles were developed 
by Francis Deng for the UN, in recognition of the lack of international framework regarding 
IDPs. They assume that the national authorities cooperate with the IDPs with the aim of 
incorporating IDP rights into the national legalization. As IDPs, by definition, still remain 
within their state, the existing laws of the country hosting them cover their rights. In addition, 
a separate legal framework concerning IDPs is often needed, since internal conflicts and civil 
wars tend to occur within weak states that have no formalized structures to cope with the 
emergency of mass displacement (Zürcher, 2007). This was the situation also in Georgia 
when the first influx of IDPs arrived. Since then Georgian authorities have worked to 
establish a judicial framework, loosely based on the Guiding Principles, beginning with the 
Law on Internally Displaced Persons.  
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5.2 Law on Internally Displaced Persons 
Georgia is one of the few countries hosting IDPs that has ratified a law outlining the 
responsibilities of the state authorities towards the IDPs. The Georgian Law on Internally 
Displaced Persons – Persecuted 45 was adopted in 1996, and since its ratification the law has 
formed the basis for all government actions towards IDPs.  
The law defines an IDP as: 
[…] a citizen of Georgia or stateless person permanently residing in Georgia, who was forced 
to leave his place of permanent residency and seek asylum within the territory of Georgia due 
to the threat to his life, health and freedom or life, health and freedom of his family members, 
as a result of aggression of a foreign state, internal conflict of mass violation of human rights 
or as a result of events determined by the paragraph 11[…]46 
This definition is slightly narrower than that of the Guiding Principles, which is: 
[…] person or groups of persons who have been forced to or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized 
State border 47 
The definition given in Georgian law does not include displacement caused by natural 
disasters, but deals exclusively with displacement as a consequence of internal conflict or 
aggression from a foreign state 48. There is a large group (116,173 people in 2011) of “eco-
migrants” displaced by natural disasters such as landslides 49. These people are IDPs 
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according to the definition given in the Guiding Principles, but Georgian authorities do not 
recognize them as such50.  
Being a person who is displaced by war or internal conflict one is, according to the 
law, given status as an IDP. An IDP status entitles the person to: a) Reside at a temporary 
place of residence, b) enjoy free utilities at a place of compact settlement, c) receive other 
types of assistance” Article 3, Paragraph 3 51. The governmental body responsible for 
ensuring the rights of IDPs is in the law identified as the MRA. The ministry is, as of October 
2002 situated in Tbilisi, but has local departments all over Georgia52. Their main 
responsibilities are: keeping a complete and comprehensive register over all the IDPs with 
updated information on their housing situation, issuing a monthly IDP allowance and ensuring 
that all IDPs reside in proper accommodation. They are also obliged to help IDPs find 
employment 53. 
5.3 State Strategy on IDPs 
The second key document, ratified by the parliament in 2007, is the State Strategy on IDPs. 
This document is based on the Law on IDPs, but is much more specific with regards to the 
responsibilities of the government in creating a viable plan for the future of the Georgian 
IDPs. It states two equal goals: to create conditions for a dignified and safe return to the 
breakaway regions, and to integrate the displaced population into Georgian society54. Even 
though the two goals are mentioned as equal, the latter is the only one elaborated upon. On 
the government’s list of seven key issues that need attention, only one deals with the issue of 
return. It can therefore be said that the State Strategy represents a shift towards a more active 
approach towards integration. When return is mentioned it is stated that: “upon resolution of 
the conflict, governmental agencies should be ready to support the dignified return of IDPs in 
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a safe environment”55. The goal of return can therefore not be realized before the conflict has 
ended, and it is not mentioned how the government works to make this happen.  
The seven main issues identified are: lack of material resources (such as land), 
unemployment, housing conditions, health and education (quality of social services), 
representation of IDP interests, dependence on assistance and difficulties related to return 56. It 
is not explained in detail how these issues shall be addressed, but it is a clear commitment to a 
more intense focus on integrating the IDPs. The State Strategy also lists a number of 
principles that government officials shall adhere to when implementing the strategy. Giving 
the ability a choice between for example different housing solutions is emphasized, and it is 
stated that they shall be part of all decisions that can affect their future. The involvement of 
IDPs in decisions concerning them is in accordance with the Guiding Principles.  
5.4 The State Action Plan 
The Action Plan is a decree of the Georgian government, and its implementation started in 
May 2010. It was originally going to be completed in 2012, but the deadline has been 
extended to 2014. It was made as a result of the 2008 war, and the caseload from South 
Ossetia is therefore included in the plan. The IDPs from South Ossetia were given durable 
housing solutions close to the de facto border shortly after being displaced. The housing was 
provided in a joint effort between the Georgian government and international NGOs present 
in Georgia at the time. The speedy accommodation of the new caseload led to dissatisfaction 
among the IDPs from Abkhazia, who had been displaced for two decades without receiving a 
durable housing solution. The Action plan’s main goal is therefore to provide all IDPs with a 
durable housing solution and to focus more on socio-economic measures, meaning reducing 
IDP dependency on the state, giving the IDPs access to health care and to focus on 
infrastructure and livelihood. However, it is only the goal of accommodation that is 
elaborated upon with a concrete plan.  
 With the Action plan, the Georgian authorities have committed themselves to a policy 
of integration. By presenting, and executing, a detailed and elaborate plan to provide all IDPs 
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with adequate housing the Georgian authorities have committed themselves to the policy of 
integration, but only “until return becomes possible”57. They have in other words not 
completely given up on the possibility of the return of the IDPs to the breakaway regions. The 
focus on return induces an element of temporality to the integration of Georgian IDPs, and it 
is unclear if and how the two goals will be pursued simultaneously.  
5.5 Political Rights of IDPs 
All three legal documents issued by the Georgian government give special political rights to 
IDPs. Article 9 Paragraph 1 of the Law on Internally Displaced persons states that all rights of 
IDPs are to be protected by the state, and that “Any illegal action of the authorities may be 
appealed to the higher authorities or to the court according to the legislation” 58. With this 
paragraph the Georgian government grants the IDPs the same rights as ordinary citizens, and 
the same right to appeal to the courts if their rights are violated. This also includes the right to 
vote and to participate in politics on all levels. This is in compliance with the guiding 
principles stating that: 
Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms 
under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall 
not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the 
ground that they are internally displaced59.  
 
The IDPs interviewed for this thesis stated that they had not experienced being denied the 
right to vote, they had however encountered problems while voting in terms of not being 
registered in the correct constituency (IDP, Poti, 12.02.12). The “propiska” system, residency 
permits given to all citizens, was abolished in Georgia in 1996, but it has de facto been in use 
in some areas of governance and more actively in some regions. This has created problems for 
IDPs, as many were registered in the constituency in which they resided immediately after 
displacement, but have since moved to other parts of the country. This has affected their 
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ability to vote in elections, to obtaine correct documentation and registration, and ultimately 
to secure proper living conditions and employment60.  
5.6 Allocation and Number of IDPs 
	  
 
This map 61 illustrates the IDP distribution of the IDP population across the country62. As seen 
on the map, the two regions that host the most IDPs are the capital Tbilisi and the Samegrelo-
Zemo Svaneti region. According to the MRA, in total 258,599 people displaced from 
Abkhazia have been granted IDP status63. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre, the number of displaced people from Abkhazia was in 2011 236,000, out of which 
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3,000 had been displaced twice64. There are several other numbers in circulation, but the 
government’s statistics seem to be the most reliable source as they are continuously updating 
the number according to how many people receive IDP allowance, and thus are granted status 
as IDPs.  
5.7 Accommodation and Durable Housing Solutions 
The Law on IDPs states “The State shall secure space of temporary residence for IDPs. The 
Ministry shall accommodate IDPs through State bodies and bodies of local self-government 
[...]”65. It is thereby the states, or more specifically the MRA’s, responsibility to ensure that 
all IDPs enjoy proper accommodation. This is in accordance with the Guiding Principles on 
displacement. Immediately after displacement the majority of the IDPs received temporary 
shelter in public and private buildings such as hotels, schools and kindergartens. Two decades 
later, these housing arrangements still prevail. Forty percent of all IDPs are still residing in 
Collective Centers (CCs)66, and 40,000 IDP households do not have ownership to their living 
arrangements (MRA Central Representative, 07.03.12). The rest have either managed to 
acquire better housing on their own, moved in with family and relatives (privately 
accommodated) or returned to their homes in the breakaway regions.  
 Durable housing solutions have been a central goal in all three key documents, but 
nothing substantial happened in this field until 2010, when the Action Plan was approved. The 
first stage of the plan targets the IDPs still living in CCs. According to the plan, the CCs 
owned by the government should be rehabilitated, and the ownership of the CC should be 
transferred to the IDPs for a symbolic price of 1 Lari (0.60 USD)67. Those who do not wish to 
privatize, live in collapsing CCs, or who lived in CCs that were privately owned should be 
offered alternative housing, primarily newly built apartments in the regions, or rehabilitated 
apartments in buildings owned by the government. New apartments have been built in Poti 
and Batumi, and there are plans to build apartment blocks in Tbilisi and Zugdidi in 2013. The 
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new apartments are given to the most vulnerable IDPS first, meaning those who reside in 
collapsing CCs.  
We try to resettle people where they have already lived. We try to offer them a housing 
solution that they are happy with. Often this means resettling them close to where they have 
lived before. The IDPs who have lived in Tbilisi should get an apartment close to Tbilisi. And 
those who receive an apartment in Poti are all from the Samegrelo region (Interview with 
Representative from MRA Central, 07.03.12).  
The second stage of the Action Plan targets IDPs living in private accommodation. The IDPs 
who own their housing will be offered to rehabilitate it, and those who rent or stay with 
relatives will be offered monetary compensation to acquire housing on their own68. It is 
unclear how much of the Action Plan has been implemented, but by March 2012 the IDPs 
residing in collapsing CCs had been identified, interviewed and offered a new housing 
solution. The construction of new apartments is completed in Poti, Potskhoeetseri and 
Batumi, and there exist plans to start building apartments in Zugdidi.  
 
 
Dissatisfaction with the housing solutions offered by the Georgian government is common 
among the IDPs, regardless of what type of solution they have received. Those who reside in 
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CCs are dissatisfied with the lack of space and insufficient access to infrastructure such as 
gas, water and electricity69. Arguing that it is difficult for them to achieve any real and 
substantial integration while residing in CCs, they feel isolated and secluded in their 
settlements. IDPs who reside in rehabilitated CCs are also dissatisfied with the quality of the 
rehabilitations, claiming that the space is insufficient for their families and that the quality of 
the apartments is substandard.  
Six people live in this apartment, it is 16 square meters and built underneath a staircase. I have 
to raise my children underneath a staircase. I used to have an apartment with 13 rooms in 
Abkhazia. And now I live here, in this hellhole (IDP, Tbilisi, 13.03.12).  
Also privatizing the housing they have accepted is an important priority for the IDPs. 
Transferring ownership of the housing from the government to the IDPs is an extensive 
process that is currently taking place. The IDPs interviewed for this thesis express that they 
would feel safer if they had ownership of their apartments. That ownership could protect them 
against evictions and new resettlement.  
The IDPs have not been provided with ownership of the apartments they have been resettled 
into. This will not happen before a year has passed. The government wants to make sure that 
the IDPs will settle before they transfer ownership to them, but why would the IDPs settle in if 
they do not have ownership? The policy is contradictory. The IDPs do not have a reason to 
stay (Gvalia, 21.02.12).   
The policy of extending the process and not transferring ownership to the IDPs immediately 
has been implemented because the government wants to ensure that the IDPs do not move 
back to the capital, but stay in the regions. The perception that this is a trick by the 
government adds to the feelings of insecurity on the part of the IDPs. They are reluctant to 
accept housing in the regions because they are not ensured ownership of their apartments. 
They are also skeptical about moving to the regions because they are afraid there will be a 
lack of available jobs there.   
5.7.1 Evictions 
Many of the IDPs occupy buildings that before the conflict functioned as something other 
than apartments. In recent years, both private owners and the authorities have initiated a 
number of evictions, seeking to return the buildings to their original purpose. This has first 
and foremost taken place in Tbilisi, where some IDPs have occupied apartments in desirable 
neighborhoods. In the summer of 2010, several evictions were carried out in and around 
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Tbilisi. According to Georgian law, the occupants should have been notified five days in 
advance, but some were only given a seven hour notice70. The IDPs were not offered 
alternative housing, and no monetary compensation was given in advance of the evictions. 
The government faces severe criticism for these actions (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2009:24). The 
same vulnerability applies to the privately accommodated IDPs who are staying at the 
goodwill of family and friends, without any secure and permanent living arrangements.  
5.7.2 My House vs. Abkhaz Policy on Ownership 
When the IDPs fled, they left their homes and most of their belongings behind. Many left 
without their documents, and can therefore not prove ownership of their former homes. In 
February 2006, Saakashvili launched a project called “ My house”. This was as an attempt to 
establish legal rights for IDPs to their properties in Abkhazia. By using satellite images and 
maps to identify the buildings, they gave the IDPs deeds to their houses in the breakaway 
regions. As of October 2008, the MRA has received and registered 67,000 ownership 
declarations from IDPs71. However, in April 2006 the Abkhaz People’s Assembly set new 
conditions for privatizing property within Abkhazia which determined that people who had 
not claimed their property in an Abkhaz court before 2003 had forfeited all their rights to that 
property. This means that only persons residing within Abkhazia can claim ownership to their 
property. In practice the de facto authorities are trying to turn all real estate formerly owned 
by the displaced or emigrated persons into state property (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010: 
98).   
5.7.3 Lazika, City of Dreams 
As of August 2012, the latest development with regards to IDP accommodation was that a 
new city is to be built, south of the de facto border, by the name Lazika. The roads to this new 
city are already under construction, and the idea is that the IDPs living in private 
accommodation shall move there. The Georgian government will build new housing for the 
privately accommodated IDPs. “Building completely new buildings is a very visible form of 
aid, you get a lot of cred for it, but it hinders social integration” (Kostohryz, 16.03.12). 
                                                 70	  Eurasianet’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61754	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  71	  Chemi	  Sakhli’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.chemisakhli.gov.ge/	  accessed	  09.11.2012	  	  	  
 47 
Georgian authorities have adopted a plan to industrialize the west coast of Georgia and 
turning it into a centre of commerce and industry. As part of this plan, the Azerbaijani 
company SOKAR has invested in a factory in Kulevi outside Poti. This will bring 
employment to the region and improve the livelihood situation, primarily by creating 
employment for IDPs72. Over the next four years, 1 billion USD will be invested in the region, 
turning it into a free trade zone there and making it an industrial center. The port will also be 
expanded, and an airport will be built outside the city. Lazika is to be populated by 1.5 million 
citizens, making it one of the largest cities in Georgia. The plan came to the president while 
he was in China73. He has also called on IDPs and emigrants to come home and populate the 
city of Lazika74.  
5.8 Employment and Livelihood Opportunities 
All IDPs who have received status as IDPs are entitled to an IDP allowance, disbursed every 
month. The current amount is 24/28 GEL (15/17 USD) per person, depending on what type of 
accommodation they are settled in 75. Those who live in CCs receive 24 GEL because they do 
not have to pay for electricity and water. Children born into IDP families where either one or 
both of the parents, are IDPs automatically receive IDP status76. The allowance can be 
collected in any state owned bank and is also available to IDPs who have returned to their 
homes in the breakaway regions, provided that they travel across the de facto border to collect 
it.  
Many rely solely on the IDP allowance for their survival, especially those who do not 
have access to land. Those who do have access to land usually sell some of their produce in 
the market to provide their household with some extra income. There are currently not 
statistics available on percentage of unemployment specifically among the IDPs, but the 
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general unemployment rate in Georgia in 2011 was 15.1%77. The Georgian statistics 
department counts subsistence farming as employment, if one deducts those only “employed” 
as subsistence farmers then the realistic unemployment rate is believed to be higher78. 
Unemployment levels among IDPs are the same as for the general population, but the 
incomes earned and positions held by IDPs are generally lower (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2009). 
The main cause of poverty among Georgians in general is the lack of employment. 
IDPs tend to have more difficulties securing a permanent job because they lack social 
networks and social capital. CRRC conducted a study in 2011, asking Georgians what the 
main factors for attaining a job were. Connections and education came out with equal results 
at 25% 79. Many IDPs reside in remote areas, and are therefore physically barred from 
attaining work. Even if they have access to land, they often do not have the equipment to 
produce food. They lack fertilizers, transport and fuel to be able to sell their produce on the 
market. Many therefore rely on small-scale trade, remittances and assistance from family and 
friends, and most importantly on the IDP allowance (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2009). 
 Poverty is very common both among the IDPs and in the general population. But 
poverty in the IDP population can be considered as more severe because they are more 
insecure in other respects, such as housing and access to land. While the general population 
usually has ownership to their houses and land, IDPs have spent the last two decades not 
knowing if they will stay in their current location, return to Abkhazia, or relocate within 
Georgia proper. The execution of the Action plan might provide the IDPs with a more 
predictable living situation, and they will thus be able to secure land and plan for their future. 
Access to land is an important safety net for many Georgians. If they lack monetary income 
they can always survive on subsistence farming. Since many IDPs do not have access to such 
resources, they have become heavily dependent on the IDP allowance. In recent years there 
has been a trend among the IDPs to relocate to Tbilisi, where there are more opportunities to 
find employment, or to the Gal/i region, where there are more opportunities to farm the land 
left behind by other IDPs (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2009:19).   
                                                 
77 Geostat’s website, available at 
http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=146&lang=eng accessed 09.11.2012 
78 CRRC found in their analysis that 61% were unemployed. See: 
http://www.crrc.ge/oda/?dataset=15&row=263 for more information 
79 CRRC’s website, available at  http://www.crrc.ge/oda/?dataset=15&row=273 accessed 
09.11.2012 	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The IDPs interviewed put a strong emphasis on employment, explaining that if they 
had an income they could free themselves from their dependency on the state. Unemployed, 
they are left without a possibility to provide for themselves and better their own situation. 
When asked to identify the main obstacle for employment, five out of the twenty IDP 
respondents mentioned discrimination towards IDPs. They claim that they are unable to find 
work because locals would rather hire other locals before they would consider hiring IDPs. 
They connect the unwillingness to hire IDPs to two factors; firstly there is a rumor that IDPs 
are untrustworthy, and secondly the locals believe that the IDPs will return to Abkhazia if the 
chance arises, and that they therefore are not reliable employees.  
If I had money and a job I would look after myself. I know where to go and what to 
buy. I would not be dependent on the government, I do not want to be dependent on 
the government. Getting a job would be the best way out of this situation (IDP, Tbilisi, 
13.03.12).  
This particular respondent used to work as an electrical engineer in Abkhazia, but has been 
unemployed since displacement. Displacement rendered many IDPs without the possibility to 
practice their profession with time they have not been able to keep up their level of expertise 
and their competence has become outdated. The lack of available employment has turned 
many IDPs into vendors, dealing in petty trades. In the regions, many IDPs sell produce in the 
markets if they can attain a booth, and in Tbilisi IDPs have become infamous for selling and 
buying gold. Petty trade does not represent a stable income, and resorting to selling your 
belongings can also not be said to be a reliable source of income.  
5.9 The Right to Return 
The Georgian government advocates the IDPs right of return as a part of their struggle to re-
establish control over the breakaway regions. As such, the whereabouts of the IDPs have 
therefore to a great extent become politicized. The principle of a right to a dignified return is 
mentioned in the Guiding Principles and in all the three key documents authored by Georgian 
authorities. The government’s emphasis on return has created a strong belief among the IDPs 
that this option will in fact materialize. This has prevented many from trying to create more 
permanent lives in displacement. The strong wish to go back has put their lives on halt, and 
they are reluctant to give up on the almost mythical idea of Abkhazia, which is portrayed as a 
paradise in stark contrast to their current reality. The consequence of longing for an 
unattainable Heimat is that the IDPs are still to some extent “sitting on their suitcases”. This 
has affected their ability to adapt and take control over their lives in displacement.  
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 The Georgian government’s emphasis on the IDPs right to return has also probably 
contributed to their impression that return is in fact attainable in the near future. Since the 
government has communicated so clearly over the years that return of the IDPs is their first 
goal and preferred outcome of the situation, many did not see any point in bettering their lives 
in displacement. Conducting improvements to their housing seemed pointless as they were 
expected to pick up and leave at any time. In this respect, the 2008 war forms a turning point 
in IDP policy; the “old” IDPs saw the war as a sign that they would never be able to return. 
Since 2008 the implementation of the action plan and the resettlement of Georgian IDPs have 
in some ways shifted the focus from return to durable housing solutions. It has also weakened 
many IDPs’ faith in that they will ever be able to go back to their former homes.  
A representative from the NGO Atinati expressed concern that the IDPs expect to 
return to the past. 
Even if return to Abkhazia becomes possible for the IDPs, they can’t travel in time, 
they will not move back to the past. If they go back they will have to start again, 
rebuild their lives there. The IDPs do not understand this, they seem to think that by 
returning to Abkhazia everything will be solved (Atinati, 23.03.12).  
 
Even though Abkhazia has become the focal point for the IDPs’ longing and their primary 
goal is to return, they are not oblivious to the changes that have taken place there over the 
years, and many have a realistic understanding of the current situation. “Whenever I close my 
eyes, I can see Abkhazia. I see my town where 1,600 families used to live, now there are only 
25 left. Trees are growing inside our house. It is a ghost town” (IDP, Poti, 11.02.12). They 
understand that the situation is complicated and that by the passing of time, return has become 
increasingly unattainable. Still return remains their main goal. Giving up on returning to 
Abkhazia is difficult as long as the Georgian government continues to emphasize their goal of 
reuniting Abkhazia with Georgia proper.  
5.9.1 The Returnees 
At least 45,000 IDPs have returned to the Gal/i district in the course of the last nineteen years. 
The number might be even higher, as some live in Gal/i seasonally, staying in Georgia proper 
during the winter and in Gal/i during the summer. After renewed hostilities in May 1998, 
almost all of the returnees were displaced again. The de facto authorities have acknowledged 
the return of the IDPs living in Gal/i. They do however keep a register of people who fought 
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in the war, and these people are not allowed to return. If they do so, they run the risk of being 
arrested (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010: 128).  
Using the Georgian language in schools or in public has caused some tension, and the 
returnees are not allowed to use textbooks that depict the history of the region in any way 
unfavorable to Abkhazia. When Abkhaz authorities started issuing passports. this became a 
problem for the Georgians residing in Gal/i. They could not hold two passports at the same 
time, so they were required to give up their Georgian one when applying for an Abkhaz 
passport. Applying for an Abkhaz passport became mandatory, and it is not possible to vote 
without being an Abkhaz citizen. This created difficulties for the returnees upon entering 
Georgia proper, as the Abkhaz passport is not valid in Georgia. If Georgians still living in 
Abkhazia accept Abkhaz citizenship, they might in fact become stateless as they can not 
travel abroad with an Abkhaz passport, and it is difficult for Georgians to obtain Russian 
passports. Finally, they could be refused entrance to Georgia and they can be drafted into the 
Abkhaz army (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi, 2010:85).  
5.10 General Economic Situation in Georgia 
Understanding the general situation in Georgia is important, as it can shed light on the relative 
poverty of IDPs. In 2010, the Caucasus Research and Resource Centre (CRRC) conducted a 
large analysis interviewing 1,991 respondents about their economic situation, including both 
IDPs and locals. They found that a high percentage of households struggle with covering 
basic expenses. The majority of the population state that they own a color television, 
refrigerators and cell phones, but lack items such as washing machines, cars and computers. 
Thirty three percent of the households interviewed said that they do not have money to buy 
enough food, while 40% said they can afford food, but not clothes. Less than 1% felt they 
could afford to buy anything they need80. A large divide between households in the capital or 
urban environments versus those in rural areas was revealed.  Twenty eight percent of people 
living in the capital and 30% of those living in urban areas say that their income is not 
sufficient for food, while 40% of the respondents in rural areas state the same. The more 
                                                 
80 CRRC's website, available 
athttp://crrccenters.org/store/files/February_11_The_Economic_Condition_of_Households_in
_Georgia%20(1).pdf  accessed 09.11.2012  
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favorable conditions for those living in the capital are attributed to the increased possibility 
for employment.81 
5.11 Education 
The government of Abkhazia was moved to Georgia proper shortly after displacement, where 
it started functioning as an Exile government. This entailed that all ministries and public 
offices were functioning in displacement after Abkhazia declared itself independent. They 
continued to work as before, but without elections or land to govern. Between 1995 and 2005 
the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (parallel to 
the Georgian Ministry of Education) established 45 public “Abkhaz” schools for the IDP 
children, providing both primary and secondary education. This was done to reinforce the IDP 
identity and prepare the IDPs for their return82. The principle of adequate and free education 
for IDPs is asserted in the law on IDPs. It states that it is the responsibility of Georgian 
authorities:“ […] to guarantee a constitutional right of IDPs to education and free study in the 
public secondary educational institutions”83. In contravention of this, the IDPs were often 
asked to pay unofficial fees to the school, in addition to books and school material for the 
kids.  
In the State Strategy of 2007, Georgian authorities express an aim to close down the 
segregated schools and integrate the IDP children into the mainstream educational system, 
this was in line with the general shift in policies from return to integration 84. This happened 
simultaneously with a general reform in the Georgian education system, making each school 
financially autonomous and run by a board of trustees, and allowing the parents to choose 
which school to send their children to85.  
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The Action Plan of 2009 elaborates on the social integration of IDPs by declaring that 
IDPs shall be fully mainstreamed into the general educational program. This is to be ensured 
by appointing a steering committee that will oversee the process and identify any potential 
barriers to the integration of IDPs86. Even though the IDP children are now enrolled in and 
attend mainstream Georgian schools, there is one element that separates them. Being tutored 
after school is a widespread practice in Georgia. Since IDP families have limited resources, 
they can’t always afford tutors for their children, and as most students believe they need a 
tutor to be successful on their exams, this might represent a handicap for the IDP children, 
and could also affect their opportunities to be admitted to a university87.  
I think there will definitely be fewer children with higher education among the IDPs compared 
to the general population. They can’t afford tutoring and they compete with children who have 
been tutored, so their chances are smaller (Gvalia, 21.02.12).  
5.12 Collective Identity or Social Category?  
As established in 2.2.1, a collective identity can create favorable preconditions for 
mobilization within a group. The common denominator uniting the members of the group is 
the foundation of collective identity. It serves as a hallmark, separating the group from the 
general population, and simultaneously bringing them closer together in their sameness. 
However, for a collective identity to become a starting point for mobilization, the shared 
characteristic has to be cultivated by the members of the group, making their membership in 
the group an integral part of who they are (Gurr, 2000). If their membership in the group is 
devoid of any meaning to the members, implying that they do not consider sharing the 
particular trait with others as important, the formation of a collective identity is impossible. 
However, if membership to the group is important to the actors, but not prioritized and valued 
as a central part of their lives, there is no foundation for collective identity. If they are 
considered by external actors to be a cohesive unit, they form a social category.  
 Applying the theoretical framework of collective identity to the case of Georgian IDPs 
is challenging, partly because their common denominator is not defined by the IDPs 
themselves. Their shared trait, their status as IDPs, and thus their basis for collective identity, 
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is derived from two separate factors; first and foremost they share their displacement. All 
IDPs have at some point fled their homes in Abkhazia and resettled in Georgia proper. The 
experience of being displaced and living in displacement for almost two decades is here 
defined as “the IDP narrative”. The Georgian IDPs share a history that the general population 
is not part of, a trauma that has largely defined their lives since displacement.  
The second factor that defines the IDPs as a group is their status as IDPs, which is 
given to them by the Georgian government. Georgian authorities decide who qualifies for IDP 
status based on certain criteria (elaborated on in 5.2). It is plausible that having an external 
actor defining who qualifies for membership in the group has affected the level of solidarity 
between the IDPs. Additionally, the governmental policy entitles all IDPs to the same 
benefits. Treating them as a homogenous group presupposes that they have similar needs, 
which might reinforce the view that all IDPs belong to the same societal stratum88. Since the 
IDPs do not share any other traits that set them apart from the local population, such as a 
separate ethnicity, race or religion89, the IDP status and the IDP narrative represent the 
primary foundation for a collective identity. Is this enough to inspire political mobilization?  
5.12.1 IDP Narrative 
The first and most obvious, common denominator for Georgian IDPs is their common 
misfortune. Even though substandard housing is also found among the poorer segment of the 
local population, the IDPs perceive themselves (and to some extent are perceived) as 
significantly underprivileged and destitute, more so than the local population. This can be 
attributed to the large discrepancy between the living standard they were accustomed to prior 
to displacement, and the conditions they have had to familiarize themselves with as IDPs. The 
feeling of being deprived of not only material goods, but also their future and the future of 
their children, is common among the IDPs.  
                                                 
88 Georgian authorities differentiate between IDPs accommodated in PA and CCs in the 
Action plan. Besides this exception, IDPs are largely eligible for the same rights and aid.  
89 The IDPs are not bound together by race, ethnicity or religion. Even though ethnicity was 
the primary criteria for their displacement during the wars in the early 90s, it can’t be said to 
be an active component in the IDP identity as they share their ethnicity with the general 
population. The IDP identity does however include a regional aspect as most IDPs displaced 
form Abkhazia are Megrelian. This has contributed to the establishment of an IDP identity, 
event though there are many local Georgians who are also Megrelian, the language and 
culture has become increasingly associated with IDPs. As the Megrelians primarily live in 
western Georgia, the IDPs who settled there have had less of a struggle integrating into 
society at large. In eastern Georgia it has hindered integration.	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“ I feel like we are a black spot in Georgia. There is no pride in being an IDP, we do 
not even like the word IDP” (IDP, Poti, 11.02.12). Experiencing their IDP status as a 
shameful aspect of their lives might hinder the establishment of a collective identity. Many 
feel victimized twice over, firstly by the Abkhaz who forced them into displacement, and 
secondly by the Georgian authorities that the IDPs feel have largely neglected them since they 
were displaced. To uncover whether or not the IDPs were ashamed to the extent of trying to 
hide their status, I asked them if their IDP status was something they mentioned when 
introducing themselves to new people. One woman replied:  
I don’t say that I am an IDP. It is not necessary; people know it just by looking at me. It is my dialect 
and my clothes and the poverty (IDP, Poti, 11.02.12).  
There are several programs for IDPs at the university, my daughter could have applied to these, but 
she refused because she did not want people to know that she was an IDP. For her it is shameful (IDP, 
Poti, 12.02.12). 
 
This was a recurring answer with several of the respondents. They said that their chances of 
attaining their goals, for example employment, were much higher if they did not include 
information about their IDP status. Others said that they would only mention their IDP status 
when they were in contact with Georgian authorities. Thus, on one hand the IDPs may 
experience a level of skepticism and discrimination from the general population if they 
mention their IDP status. On the other hand they have a chance of being prioritized by the 
authorities if they invoke their status as IDPs.  
Some of the respondents took issue with the premise of the question: “Why would I 
mention that I am an IDP? I am Georgian. All IDPs are Georgians. It is society that sees us as 
IDPs first, then as Georgians”(IDP, Poti, 12.02.12). The unwillingness to be even associated 
with their IDP status could hinder the formation of an IDP identity. They do not want their 
IDP status to matter when it comes to how they are treated. They feel that there is a 
discrepancy between the way that society views them and how they see themselves. Seeing 
the IDP status as a hindrance that prevents them from becoming regular citizens is common. 
They wish to rid themselves of the unpleasantness and feeling of being unworthy that they 
associate with the IDP status.  
Even though they take no pride in their status as IDPs, several of the respondents took 
pride in the hardship they have endured. They see themselves as survivors rather than victims, 
which perhaps serves as a more comfortable starting point for a collective identity. The IDP 
narrative is largely connected to what they have gone through, but it also has a component of 
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pride in that they have persevered. The duality between identifying with both the victim and 
the survivor complicates the IDP narrative, creating an ambiguity that several of the 
respondents have had difficulty coming to terms with.  
5.12.2 External Actors’ Perspectives on IDP Identity 
“The IDPs are divided as a social category, only a few are completely integrated” (Davitaia, 
09.03.12).  
Paata Davitaia, MP for the European Democrats – a party of and for IDPs, expressed himself 
in no uncertain terms about the IDP identity. He connected the IDPs exclusion from society in 
general to their lack of integration and the high levels of poverty among IDPs. Focusing 
especially on the IDPs who are forced to reside in CCs, he claimed that living secluded and 
grouped together has isolated the IDPs and contributed to the formation of an IDP 
community. Irrespective of whether or not the IDPs have internalized a collective identity, he 
claimed that Georgian society at large has assigned the IDPs to a social category, separated 
from the general population.  
Head of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Georgia, Petr Kostohryz, also points to 
poverty as the factor that separates the IDPs from the general population. This leads to the 
IDPs being perceived, and perceiving themselves, as a group existing on the outside of 
general society.  
They feel marginalized because they don’t have access to the same standard of living as the 
rest of the population, not because they are IDPs. This is where the main difference lies; their 
poverty is what separates them from society in general, not their status as IDPs. They are a 
class that has not been socialized into society (Kostohryz, 11.03.12).  
 Both these actors focus on poverty as a uniting factor for Georgian IDPs; it is assumed that 
they are poor because they are IDPs. Poverty thereby functions as a shared trait, in addition 
to, and not instead of, their IDP status.  
5.12.3 Collective Identity or Social Category?  
As the IDPs themselves do not identify with a separate IDP identity, it would be contradictory 
to say that there is one, since it is first and foremost the reflections of the actors themselves 
that should be taken into account when deciding whether or not there is in fact an IDP 
identity. Even so, the society surrounding the IDPs clearly views them as one group. The 
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government has designed a law and a policy specifically concerning IDPs, and the population 
at large clearly defines them as a social category within Georgia. Whether or not the IDPs 
have internalized this separation from general society, they are in fact singled out as a group 
and target of a set of all encompassing policies solely designed to fit their needs.  
They take pride in their shared trauma and of having survived their ordeal, but this 
does not necessarily indicate that there is a large amount of solidarity among the IDPs. Seeing 
that the IDP status is connected more to shame and a sense of powerlessness, it might be more 
precise to classify the IDPs as a social category, meaning that they do not share a collective 
identity, but a set of common characteristics that groups them together. A social category is 
still a potent starting point for mobilization, but the lack of collective identity entails a lack of 
solidarity that could potentially glue the members together. A high level of organization can 
compensate for the lack of collective identity.  
5.13 Integration 
Integration can be measured in several different ways; one can look at factors such as level of 
income, employment, representation in the political system, and intermarriage between the 
two different groups. Philipp Ther presents a definition based on the Latin roots of the word 
integration: “[…] it is the penetration of a smaller group into a larger group that results in the 
whole group being reformed”(Ther, 1996). This means that the IDPs, if integrated, would not 
form a visible minority in Georgia proper today, but rather a natural part of Georgian society 
at large.  
 When asked, the IDPs state that they do not feel integrated du to the fact that they do 
not own their own houses, they emphasize ownership as an important criteria for them to feel 
at home (IDP, Tbilisi, 13.03.12). The government is working on providing the IDPs with 
housing solutions, but is ownership of a house sufficient to be integrated? Leder of NRC, Petr 
Kostohryc differentiated between infrastructural integration and social integration; 
Integration is not housing, Integration is feeling comfortable where you are. Social integration 
is as important as infrastructural integration. The consistent response from the MRA is that 
social integration is taken care of by the NGOs. But the NGOs can’t create employment for all 
IDPs, creating employment possibilities can only be done by the government (Kostohryz, 
16.03.12).  
He connects social integration to employment, the thought being that by becoming less 
dependent on government aid, the IDPs will become empowered and part of the societal 
structure. As we have seen, the IDPs are differentiated from the general population by 
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government policies and to some extent, by their own perception of themselves. Does the 
Georgian population regard the IDPs as different? CRRC conducted a survey in 2011, where 
one of the questions was whether IDPs were different from Georgian citizens at large. Thirty 
five percent of the local population completely disagreed, whereas only 2% completely 
agreed90.  
 
 
 
According to this data, the general population does not necessarily view the IDPs as 
noticeably different from themselves. The exclusion the IDPs feel might come as a result of 
their shared narrative that the general population does not partake in, and by their physical 
isolation, residing in settlements and CCs makes it difficult for IDPs to interact with 
neighbors that are locals, leaving them to socialize with eachother.  
 The majority of the IDPs interviewed for this study stated that they felt better and 
more at home in Abkhazia, and that they do not feel integrated in the local community in 
displacement. The ones who had recently resettled feel even less integrated. They see 
resettlement as a second displacement, and they feel like they are going through many of the 
same difficulties as they did when they first arrived.  
                                                 90CRRC’s	  website,	  available	  at	  http://www.crrc.ge/oda/?dataset=16&row=159	  accessed	  09.11.2012	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“There are only a few IDPs who are completely integrated, but they are not many. 
This is not only dependent on their finances; some might have good finances, but still not be 
integrated” (Davitaia, 09.03.12). The leader of the IDP party European Democrats, Mr. 
Davitaia, notes that the chance of integrating is higher if the IDPs have a solid economy. He 
connects integration to poverty; the IDPs are denied the opportunity to participate in society at 
large because they are poor. They spend all their energy on putting food on the table, and are 
therefore deprived of the opportunity to participate in society as equals.  
The policy of return is still a state doctrine, the right to return is unquestionable and it is not 
laughable, and you don’t speculate about that. Even if everyone is speculating. Integration is 
just a word, it is driven forward by the international community. You can’t keep people 
hostage…. When people are supposed to return, you need them to be strong, powerful and 
educated. We need to offer it to them here, so that they are the best people they can be when 
they go back (Kostohryz, 16.03.12).  
The state policies developed by the Georgian government focus more on the infrastructural 
side of integration than the social. Their first priority is to secure the IDPs’ access to housing 
and employment. This relatively unilateral focus on infrastructure is deliberate, as there is a 
fear that if the government focuses too extensively on integration. The goal of return will 
disappear and the government will indirectly have admitted defeat in winning back Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 24.02.12). By riding two horses and pursuing both 
return and integration simultaneously the government has kept the IDPs waiting and 
prevented either goal from being realized. They have also been criticized for recreating the 
CCs by building large settlements for the IDPs, creating a stigma around the IDPs and 
preventing them from integrating into their local community (Sumbadze, 27.02.12).  
5.14 Discrimination Against Georgian IDPs 
Discrimination against IDPs affects both the level of integration and the level of solidarity 
among the IDPs and thus their ability to mobilize. When asked if they felt equal to, better than 
or less worthy than the general population, the majority of the respondents, especially in the 
regions, answered that they felt they were less worthy than the general population. “ We are 
second class citizens. If we were equal why would they neglect us for so long?”(IDP, Poti, 
12.02.12). When asked if they can identify an aspect of their lives where they feel especially 
discriminated against, the respondents answer livelihood. This might be connected to social 
networks; acquiring a job in Georgia could be easier with a solid social network, as it is 
everywhere. However, the IDPs lost their networks when they were displaced. As they have 
60 
lived together with IDPs in CCs, it has been difficult for them to rebuild and make new 
connections to locals.  
“Marriages between IDPs and locals are frowned upon, we are not good enough for the locals because 
we are so poor”(IDP, Poti, 11.02.12).  
“It used to be that IDPs and locals did not marry, but now it is different. IDPs and locals can be 
together. It is not shameful anymore”(IDP, Tbilisi, 13.02.12).  
These two quotes illustrate a difference between the regions and an urban setting. The IDPs in 
Poti still did not consider it as “normal” to be married to locals. But in Tbilisi this was no 
longer considered to be abnormal. There is a difference in the level of discrimination and 
integration between the two settings; the IDPs in Tbilisi are more integrated and less 
discriminated against. This is probably because the IDPs in Tbilisi are less visible and part of 
a larger, urban scene. The IDPs settled in rural areas are often very visible, as they live in 
large settlements and more isolated than what is possible in the capital.  
This chapter has presented an overview of the existing preconditions for political 
mobilization among Georgian IDPs. We have seen that their main goals are return, durable 
housing solutions and employment, which corresponds to the goals the Georgian government 
has on behalf of the IDPs. They form a social category with an IDP narrative largely 
constructed around their suffering in displacement. They are victimized and ostracized from 
society at large, they are not integrated socially, but they have gained access to basic 
infrastructure through the governments efforts to provide them with durable housing 
solutions. They feel discriminated against in that they perceive themselves as second-class 
citizens, but the discrimination is not coming from the authorities as they have largely granted 
IDPs the same political rights as the local population enjoy. Rather it is the skepticism 
towards employing IDPs and towards marriages between IDPs and locals that serve as the 
basis for this conclusion.  
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6 Political Mobilization 
The aim of this chapter is to establish how and to what degree the Georgian IDPs have 
mobilized collectively and individually to further their interest and defend their rights. In 
order to do that we will begin by taking a closer look at the resources available to Georgian 
IDPs, before we see how they have employed these resources and organized their efforts 
towards political mobilization.  
6.1 Resources Available to the IDPs 
In 5.11 we saw that the Georgian IDPs do not share a strong collective identity. However, the 
general population and the Georgian authorities view them as one homogenous group, which 
has led to the formation of IDPs as a social category. Their separation from society at large is 
not lost on the IDPs; the lack of integration has added to their common narrative of 
deprivation and suffering, and they regard themselves as underprivileged and isolated. The 
objective truth as to whether or not IDPs are in fact excluded is not of significance, because it 
is the IDPs’ perception of their own situation that fuels their will and motivation to mobilize.  
The high level of impatience and frustration within the IDP community, created by 
almost two decades of not knowing whether or not they would return to Abkhazia, has formed 
a spark that is easily ignited. In accordance with Gurr’s theory on deprivation as motivation 
(2011), the Georgian IDPs are motivated to mobilize by the high level of discomfort that has 
characterized their lives since displacement. Seeing as deprivation creates motivation it 
becomes a resource the IDPs use to mobilize politically. The Georgian IDPs have extensive 
experience with being deprived of their lives in Abkhazia; the misfortune of being displaced 
has served as a backdrop to their lives for the last nineteen years. And even though it might 
have motivated their mobilization immediately after displacement, they are now accustomed 
to a certain level of discomfort. Thus, for deprivation to function as a resource used towards 
mobilization, they have to experience an additional trauma or burden, for example being 
evicted.  
The low level of solidarity within the IDP community has created a situation where the 
IDPs are not easily mobilized by grievances experienced by other IDPs. They do not 
experience other IDPs’ misfortune as their own, and they do not mobilize out of sympathy. 
The lack of solidarity prevents the creation of a broader social movement, and creates a 
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pattern where the political mobilization consists of contentious episodes that are isolated from 
each other. 
Perhaps the most important resource available to the Georgian IDPs is the sympathy 
they enjoy from external sponsors, i.e. the international community present in Georgia. Both 
the international and the local NGOs have a strong focus on IDP issues and support the IDPs 
in their claims towards the government. Reports on different aspects of the lives of IDPs are 
produced continually and made available both to the public and to the government. Several of 
the NGOs conduct trainings with IDPs, teaching them what they are entitled to according to 
the Action Plan and the State Strategy.  
We conduct advocacy trainings in IDP settlements. We ask the IDPs what problems they have 
and then we discuss with them as a group how they can go about solving their problems. If 
they need the government’s support to fix their issues, we put them in touch with the correct 
representative from either MRA or the local municipality. We have also taken IDPs directly to 
the MRA so that they can see how to file complaints and establish direct links of 
communication (CHCA,13.02.12).  
 
Training IDPs on their rights and giving them the opportunity to voice their complaints 
directly to government officials are two examples of how the NGOs work as mediators 
between the IDPs and the government. They also empower the IDPs in that the NGOs help 
the IDPs become more competent in dealing with the Georgian bureaucracy. Knowing what 
they are entitled to can help the IDPs be more assertive in their claims towards the 
government.  
A multitude of international donors fund both the local and international NGOs’ 
operating in Georgia. The European Union is by far the largest contributor, donating 500 
million Euro over three years after the 2008 war91. 120 million Euros were earmarked IDP 
welfare, available shortly after the war. The money was used to provide all IDPs displaced 
from South Ossetia with a durable housing solution. The Saakashvili administration has had a 
strong ambition to integrate Georgia into Europe, and eventually become part of the European 
Union; an ambition that might influence their IDP policies, seeing as the EU is their largest 
donor. The concurrence between the strong political ambition of the Georgian government to 
become part of the EU, and the fact that the EU, being the largest donor of aid to Georgia, has 
a clear preference for policies beneficial to the IDP population, creates a situation that is very 
fortunate for Georgian IDPs. The government is interested in appearing in a favorable light, 
                                                 
91 EU’s website, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-
cooperation/georgia/georgia_en.htm accessed 07.11.2012 
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and is thereby inclined to comply with the demands of the EU. This represents an opening in 
the Political Opportunity Structure that the IDP can utilize to their benefit. Have they?  
6.2 Organizing to Mobilize 
Looking at how the IDPs have utilized the resources available to them towards political 
mobilization, it is possible to differentiate between two channels of mobilization; first we find 
formal, institutionalized organizations representing IDP interests. By institutionalized 
organizations I mean that they have become an integral part of the state structure. The main 
tool that these organizations employ towards the interests of IDPs is continually putting 
pressure on the Georgian government to maintain focus on IDP issues. Together they 
resemble an IDP lobby.  The second channel of mobilization is more informal in that it exists 
outside of the official governmental structure. It consists of smaller groups of IDPs that 
initiate contentious episodes ad hoc, conducting demonstrations or protests.  
The two channels work towards the same goals shared by all IDPs; return, housing and 
employment. They both target the government as recipient of their claims, but they use 
different tools in their efforts to achieve the shared goals, i.e. they draw on different 
Repertoires of Contention when mobilizing. They also have a different starting point with 
regards to responding to openings in the Political Opportunity Structure, even though the two 
channels share the same ultimate goals, they might not share the same perception of how 
these goals are to be achieved, and thus respond differently to opportunities presenting 
themselves along the way. On the grounds of these differences the two channels of 
mobilization will be presented separately in the following section.  
6.2.1 IDP Organizations 
Mama Saxlisis – Community Leaders 
At the bottom of the organizational ladder, meaning the level in most direct contact with 
IDPs, we find the Mama Saxlisis, meaning community leaders. Each IDP settlement or CC 
usually has its own Mama Saxlisi. They are either elected by the IDPs living in the CC, or 
appointed by the MRA. Their primary function is to act as a link of communication between 
the IDPs and the local municipality, more specifically the local MRA-department. The IDPs 
in Poti who were interviewed for this thesis reported that they had elected their Mama Saxlisi, 
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on the grounds of who were more active and articulate. Each building in the settlement chose 
one person to run for the role as Mama Saxlisi, and then they held an election, choosing one 
leader of the entire community.  
The Mama Saxlisis are considered to be spokespersons for IDP issues, but their 
loyalty has sometimes been questioned by the IDPs. The Mama Saxlisis appointed by the 
MRA receive a small salary for their services, creating confusion among the IDPs as to 
whether their leader represents their interests, or the interests of the government.  
Sometimes when we organize group discussions in settlements and the Mama Saxlisis are 
present, we experience that the IDPs are hesitant to express their views in front of the Mama 
Saxlisis. They don’t raise their concerns because the Mama Saxlisis have told them 
beforehand what to say and what not to say. The Mama Saxlisis direct the situation and 
instruct the IDPs (Gvalia, 21.02.12).  
It seems peculiar that the Mama Saxlisis would instruct the IDPs to keep quiet about their 
grievances in the presence of representatives from NGOs that can accommodate the IDPs and 
help them with their problems, if the Mama Saxlisis in fact genuinely represented the interests 
of the IDPs. The respondents claimed that as long as the Mama Saxlisis continue to receive a 
salary from the MRA, the IDPs could not expect a fair representation of their interests, but a 
continued bias towards the interests of the government.  
We arranged a meeting in a settlement the same day that Sarkozy was in Tbilisi, the 
government had arranged a big meeting on Liberty square. When we arrived to the settlement 
there were no IDPs there because the Mama Saxlisis had been told to send the IDPs in buses 
to Tbilisi to attend the meeting on Liberty Square. The IDPs went to this meeting because they 
were afraid that if they did not they would get problems with their Mama Saxlisi (Gvalia, 
21.02.12).  
The Mama Saxlisis that are appointed by the government might work more towards the 
interests of the MRA, than the IDPs themselves. In these cases they do not work as mediators, 
but rather as government agents. The respondent from central MRA confirmed that some of 
the Mama Saxlisis are appointed, and that they receive a salary for their efforts. He claimed 
that their only function is to provide information to the MRA about the general state of the 
settlement and any grievances the inhabitants might have. He rejected the notion that the 
Mama Saxlisis are hired to manipulate the IDPs into presenting their situation as more 
favorable to external donors.  
The appointment of Mama Saxlisis by the MRA seemed more prevalent in and around 
Tbilisi. Respondents from this area expressed confusion as to whether or not their community 
leaders received salary. The IDPs interviewed who had elected their community leader were 
considerably more satisfied with the situation. They reported all their grievances to the Mama 
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Saxlisi, who in turn communicated these to the local government. In these settlements the 
Mama Saxlisis form an important and valuable asset in helping the IDPs voicing their 
grievances towards both local municipalities and MRA. Thus functioning as spokespersons 
for the IDPs in the local community, and organizing their collective efforts towards reaching 
their goals. Consequently, the CCs with an appointed community leader lose an important 
link to the local municipality, and thus the ability to get their opinions across.  
The Abkhaz Government-in-Exile 
The second example of an organization working for IDP interests is the Abkhaz Government-
in-exile. As mentioned in Chapter 4 they were quite vocal on behalf of IDP rights directly 
after their displacement. However, the Shevardnadze administration downsized the 
Government-in-exile substantially in 1999, both by reducing their funding and by cutting the 
number of employees. As a result the Government-in-exile has lost its role as mouthpiece for 
IDP issues. The representative from Government-in-exile interviewed for this study, 
underlined that the exile government still has a potential for acting on behalf of the IDPs from 
Abkhazia, but admits that their role is primarily symbolic. “We should be a spokesperson, but 
we are not. In reality we are a marionette government that only hands out small-scale things 
such as TVs etc. It is only for show, we are not making any decisions”(Representative from 
Government-in-Exile, 27.02.12). The willingness of the respondent from the Government-in-
Exile to express his profound disillusionment so openly is surprising. According to him, the 
Government-in-exile receives detailed directions from the Georgian authorities, outlining and 
limiting their role.  
Ideally, the exile government would work for the welfare of Georgian IDPs, putting pressure 
on the government towards the goal of return…instead we come to work everyday and just sit 
there. There is no work to be done! The only function of the exile government is employment 
for those who work there. We have a ministry of forestry, but no forests, we have a ministry of 
transport, but no trains. It is all just pretense (Representative from Government-in-Exile, 
27.02.12).  
The majority of the IDPs interviewed express little or no trust in the Government-in-exile’s 
ability to represent their interests. “The Government-in-Exile is a knight without a head” 
(Imedi, 14.02.12). Some highlighted its inherent potential, concluding that with the right 
leadership it could in fact be a powerful actor.  
 The representative from the Government-in-Exile identified return as the main interest 
of IDPs, however the Government-in-Exile was, in his view, powerless in affecting the 
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current situation and in helping IDPs towards their goal of going back. “We used to distribute 
IDP allowances, we were in charge of educating all IDP children and helping those who have 
returned to Gal/i. The MRA has taken over all of our functions” (Representative from 
Government-in-Exile, 27.02.12). The MRA taking over all functions of the Government-in-
Exile has, according to the respondent, led to the Government-in-Exile losing all possibilities 
to influence the future of Georgian IDPs. He interpreted the focus on building durable 
housing solutions for IDPs in the Action Plan as a sign that the central government has given 
up on return as a possibility for Georgian IDPs. This has created a lot of disillusionment 
among the IDPs and it also created a discrepancy between the government’s goals on behalf 
of Georgian IDPs and the goals of the IDPs, “Georgian IDPs will never give up the hope of 
return, our government might give up, but we will never do so”(Representative from 
Government-in-Exile, 27.02.12). He admitted paradoxically that the number of IDPs who 
want to go back is declining. He attributed this to the fact that as more and more children are 
born in displacement, moving to Abkhazia would be a displacement for them, and thus their 
families wish to stay where their children have grown up. Also, as IDPs are dying in 
displacement, their families are reluctant to move away from their dead relatives’ graves. The 
representative claimed that the central government is just waiting for people to forget about 
Abkhazia and slowly integrate into the general population.  
IDP Party- European Democrats of Georgia 
Paata Davitaia, former Minister of Justice in the Government-in-Exile and IDP from 
Abkhazia, has formed a separate political party working exclusively for the rights of Georgian 
IDPs. He began, in 2005, by establishing an NGO called “Chven Tviton” (We, Ourselves). In 
2006 the NGO was re-established as a political party called the European Democrats of 
Georgia. The party has participated in two elections, and has managed to get one MP in the 
Parliament. Even though the NGO transformed into a political party, the charter remained the 
same, focusing primarily on the rights of IDPs.  
60 percent of our members are IDPs, and our main priority is to facilitate and promote the 
issues of IDPs. We are trying to criticize the government and direct their focus to the fact that 
90 percent of all IDPs are unemployed. We also focus on the lack of healthcare available to 
IDPs and their right to return to Abkhazia (Davitaia, 09.03.12).  
Mr. Davitaia identified pressure on central government as his party’s main tool in trying to 
accomplish its goals. He said that the work of the European Democrats of Georgia consist 
primarily of putting IDP issues on the agenda in Parliament. When the IDP respondents were 
 67 
asked whether they had faith in Mr. Davitaia’s political party and if they voted for him, some 
said that they did not recognize their own goals in the charter of the European Democrats of 
Georgia. Some even said that they thought the party was created only to benefit the personal 
interests of Mr. Davitaia, and that as he had never lived in a CC he was in fact not an IDP 
(IDP, Poti, 12.02.12).  
6.2.2 Evaluation of the Organizations Representing IDPs 
The three organizations representing IDPs do so on different levels. The Mama Saxlisis 
mobilize primarily towards the local municipalities, the Government-in-Exile mobilizes 
primarily towards the executive branch of the central government, and the European 
Democrats of Georgia mobilize towards the Parliament. Together they form a public lobby 
representing IDP interests. They attempt to influence different power-holders in the Georgian 
governmental structure to focus and accommodate IDP interests. The three organizations are 
all part of the formal state structure; the European Democrats are represented in Parliament, 
the Government-in-exile is paid by and receive directions from the government, and the 
Mama Saxlisis, with the exception of those who have been elected, are paid and report back to 
the MRA.  
Their integration into the state structure gives them the opportunity to influence the 
power-holders more directly. Seeing as the opportunity to influence IDP policy is their main 
asset, their Repertoire of Contention consists primarily of methods of persuasion. Mr. 
Davitaia exemplifies this in the following quote:  
I asked the Speaker of the Georgian parliament, David Bakradze, to support me in trying to 
include a clause about the evictions of Georgian IDPs in the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly’s resolution on Georgia. He agreed, and a clause was included, 
stating that the Assembly was concerned about the evictions and that they encouraged the 
Georgian authorities to ensure that all future evictions will comply with international standards 
(Davitaia, 09.03.12).  
By using their personal networks representatives from these organizations they can get direct 
access to the arena where decisions are made, representing an opportunity to influence policy 
made on IDP issues. 
Even though few decisions are made on IDP policy in the local municipalities, the 
Mama Saxlisis have the opportunity to communicate the needs and goals of the IDPs directly 
to the correct authority, the MRA. If their goals are communicated from the local MRA to 
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central MRA, it might affect the policy made on IDP issues. However, it is difficult to obtain 
information on the inner workings of the ministry. Furthermore, the IDPs can’t be sure that 
their efforts lead to results. Even if their opinions are not taken into account, the 
communication link might be ideal for solving local issues or problems. In the settlements 
where the IDPs have elected their Mama Saxlisi, the IDPs receive a fair representation of their 
interests. The IDPs who have an appointed Mama Saxlisi might not be guaranteed the same 
unbiased representation. In these cases it seems that the Mama Saxlisis function more as a 
tool for the government to impose their directions on the IDPs, than the other way around.  
The organization with the least amount of power to influence is the Government-in-
exile, formerly a powerful representative for IDP issues, they are now without trust in the IDP 
community and, it seems, without faith in itself. Regardless, the Government-in-Exile has 
been preserved all these years, and still remains an important symbol of the IDPs right. And it 
still hopes one day to return to Abkhazia. The Government-in-Exile’s role should not be 
disregarded completely, as it might regain its influence and become an even more potent 
symbol of IDP unity, should the situation change with regards to the conflict between 
Abkhazia and Georgia.  
The European Democrats of Georgia, even though they enjoy little confidence among 
the IDPs interviewed for this thesis, is a potent actor with a lot of potential to influence and 
create attention to IDP issues. The mere fact that there exists a separate political party devoted 
to the interests of IDPs proves that they have substantial support among the IDP population in 
general. They have managed to secure enough votes to pass the election threshold, and 
thereby gained an important seat in Parliament. The representation of IDP interests in 
Parliament allows for their perspectives to be presented and taken into account.  
Gaining access to power often involves a struggle to stay in power. Fearing the 
complete dissolution of their organization if they rattle the chains too loud might be reason 
enough to keep quiet. Thus, the organizations might end up moderating their claims to stay in 
position. This fear also involves a reduced ability to act on opportunities that present 
themselves in the Political Opportunity Structure. Opportunities are often used to gain access 
to the political arena in general (Tarrow, 2011), these organizations have already gained 
access to the arena, and can thus become more concerned with staying in it, rather than 
risking being excluded if they fail in pursuing their goals. The organizations representing 
IDPs seek to pursue their goals within the framework of established institutions, making them 
less apt to challenge the societal norm, and more inclined to follow the general rules of 
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conduct. Failure to seize opportunities when they present themselves leads to a perception 
among the IDPs of these organizations as hamstrung and inefficient, creating a lack of trust 
and suspicions of corruption. 
6.3 Contentious Episodes 
The second channel of IDP mobilization is carried out by smaller, informal groups of IDPs. 
These groups tend to be established ad hoc as a response to specific changes in IDP policy, 
thus they do not consist of the same actors from episode to episode, but rather of many 
different informal groups within the IDP community. More often than not, the IDPs 
participating in these groups have been afflicted by a specific change in policy that has 
affected their lives in a negative way and added to their already existing feeling of 
deprivation, motivating them to mobilize. The change of participants from episode to episode 
makes it hard to identify leaders or initiators, so we will therefore take a look at how their 
mobilization manifests itself, i.e. the Repertoire of Contention of ordinary IDPs.   
Demonstrations 
The most common form of contention among Georgian IDPs is demonstrations. Usually they 
are held in places that are connected to the subject of the demonstration, or outside the office 
of the governmental agency that the demonstration is directed towards, most often outside the 
MRA office in Tbilisi. There have been large demonstrations in the regions as well, either in 
connection to the local MRA office, or within the IDP settlements. Demonstrations are 
characterized by being a low cost type of mobilization, meaning that they do not require much 
more than attendance from those participating. They have therefore become a popular form of 
mobilization among IDPs. Additionally, it is difficult to identify the initiators and 
participants, allowing for IDPs who fear repercussions from the government to participate. 
 As the level of grievance is always quite high among the Georgian IDPs it is not 
difficult for the initiators to gather people. That being said, the IDPs participating in 
demonstrations are often those who can identify with the slogans of the demonstrations. It is 
rare that IDPs from the regions travel to Tbilisi to participate in demonstrations if they 
themselves have not been affected by a recent change in policy. This might indicate a lack of 
solidarity within the IDP community, but it can also be symptomatic of their general 
economic situation, in that they simply can’t afford the travel fee to go to the capital.  
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 The majority of the demonstrations organized by IDPs are in one way or the other 
connected to housing issues. There has not been held very many demonstrations under the 
slogan of return to the breakaway regions, most likely because this goal is more complex, and 
not dependent on government efforts alone. The housing issues have more direct and feasible 
solutions, and the Georgian government is clearly responsible for any issues related to 
housing.  
IDPs set up a camp outside the local MRA office in Batumi protesting against thirty-
five local families having received new apartments in the blocks build specifically for IDPs92. 
In 2009 IDPs protested against the government’s refusal to let them privatize their apartments, 
this demonstration continued for several days93. In August 2010 ten IDPs conducted a hunger 
strike outside the MRA, and four of the participants sewed their mouths shut as part of a 
protest against being resettled to the faraway provincial town of Potskhoetseri94. The 
resettlement of IDPs to Potskhoetseri has been widely criticized by the IDPs resettled there as 
a failed project.  
The government has not recognized that Potskhoe has failed, but it is perhaps the most 
prominent example of failed IDP policy in Georgia so far. Almost all the IDPs who were 
resettled there have ended up moving back into their old CCs in Tbilisi. They did not stay in 
Potskhoetseri because there is nothing there, no market, no possibilities for employment It is 
just a desolate place in the woods (Davitaia, 09.03.12).  
As the IDPs who were resettled to Potskhoe initially accepted this housing solution, they do 
not qualify for additional help with regards to housing. They will however need to move out 
of the CCs; the buildings were emptied by the government because they are either collapsing, 
or the government has other plans for the buildings. They are now at the risk of being evicted.  
Literally Burning for the Cause 
In October 2010, as part of the demonstrations against resettlement to Potskhoetseri, Nana 
Pipia, a 46 year old IDP woman, set fire to herself outside the MRA. She subsequently died of 
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the injuries95. The demonstrations had then been going on for 18 days, drawing a large crowd 
of IDPs every day96. Mrs. Pipia had been offered alternative housing in Potskhoetseri. She 
refused the offer on the grounds that she did not know how to make a living in the regions. 
The MRA official she had spoken to had apparently answered her that she could eat grass, 
which infuriated her and she had declared that if IDPs “are seen as cattle by the government, 
the only thing she could do was set fire to herself”97. The response from the MRA at the time 
was that such extreme measures would not resolve anything. Her case was later brought 
before the Parliament, by the European Democrats among others, in an effort to replace Koba 
Subeliani as minister of the MRA. The minister had then replied that the case was a personal 
tragedy and that it should not be exploited for political purposes. The proposition to have him 
replaced was voted down and he remained in his position98.  
Symptomatic to the case of Mrs. Pipia, as well as other IDPs demonstrating against 
resettlement to Potskhoetseri, is that she was not offered a choice, if she refused the housing 
solution offered in Potskhoetseri, she would not receive a solution at all. Either way she 
would face eviction from the CC she was residing in, creating a deadlocked situation where 
she in fact had no other way out than accepting the solution offered to her by the MRA. The 
Action Plan states the right of IDPs to a free choice between housing solutions, this has for 
many not been a reality, and the IDPs are left with the choice of being homeless or accepting 
housing in the regions, resulting in a radicalization of the tools the IDPs are willing to use, 
and increased desperation among the IDPs. Similarly, there have been cases where IDPs have 
threatened to commit suicide if evicted or not otherwise helped by the government. The 
representative from the local MRA office in Poti told this story: 
We had a woman who asked us for help with her electricity bill. She could not afford the 
electricity because she had a very sick child, and therefore large hospital bills. When she 
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returned from the hospital the electricity was shut off and the cold environment was not 
helpful to her child, still recovering from illness. She was desperate and threatened to commit 
suicide in the MRA office if we did not help. The MRA ended up paying for her electricity 
(Chachkhiani, 12.02.12).  
Left without a choice and no means to better their own situation, the IDPs are left with no 
other choices than to threaten the MRA with extreme measures. This tactic works to the 
extent that the MRA is perhaps afraid of the negative media attention these situations might 
elicit if they do not comply with the demands of the IDPs.  
The most elaborate protests organized by IDPs so far occurred in June 2010 when the 
authorities evicted several thousand IDPs from government owned CCs. Most of the evicted 
IDPs were offered alternative housing in the regions, but some were evicted without an 
alternative, essentially putting them on the streets and making them homeless99. The IDPs did 
not protest against being evicted there is an understanding in the IDP community that they 
can’t occupy government buildings forever, and they don’t want to stay in these CCs 
themselves, but they protested against the lack of an alternative offered to them prior to being 
evicted. The government received massive criticism from the international community present 
in Georgia for the way these evictions were conducted. The government responded to the 
criticism and demonstrations by adopting a set of guidelines outlining how evictions should 
be conducted in the future. The guidelines did not put the IDPs at ease because the guidelines 
were not retroactive, and the IDPs who had already been evicted carried on with massive 
demonstrations in front of the MRA100.  
The Georgian IDPs usually demonstrate after a decision that affects their future has been 
made. If they had participated, demonstrated and asked questions earlier in the process it 
would have been easier for them. But they do not have the right information and they don’t 
know where to get the information about when and where decisions affecting them are made 
because it is not available to the public (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 24.02.12).  
 Tarkhan-Mouravi points out an essential aspect that greatly affects the IDPs ability to 
mobilize: the lack of transparency that characterizes the Georgian government’s decision-
making process. The IDPs do not have access or insight into how and when governmental 
policy on IDP issues is developed, thus they are not able to influence the policy while it is 
under development. They learn about changes in IDP policy only when it is implemented. 
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Mobilizing against adopted policy is considerably more difficult than affecting it when it is 
underway. This creates frustration and desperation, and the IDPs are forced to use more 
extreme measures to be heard.  
Letters to the Government 
The IDPs send a lot of letters to the government, this is a tradition that is part of the Soviet 
Legacy. They have no real experience of working with the government, other than demanding 
and requesting small favors either trough demonstrations or letters (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 
24.02.11).  
Writing letters to governmental agencies is widespread practice among IDPs, they write to ask 
about the government plans for their housing solution, to file complaints or to ask for small 
remittances and additional aid. These letters are sent to both local and central MRA, but very 
often also to the executive branch of government, addressed directly to the president. The 
IDPs expressed that; “If Saakashvili knew about our situation, he would be appalled. We need 
to talk to him directly, and explain our problems to him, then he will fix everything”(IDP, 
Poti, 13.02.12). This quote illustrates an opinion shared by many of the respondents to this 
thesis. Saakashvili is depicted as the uninformed leader and the truth about the dire situation 
of Georgian IDPs is being kept from him. He is presented with false information that if it 
were to be corrected, would change the Georgian government’s policy towards IDPs. They 
believe in him as their benefactor, and attribute the lack of aid simply to him not knowing 
how much they need it. In an effort to correct this they send letters addressed directly to him, 
describing their situation and their demands. One of the respondents in Poti had even written a 
statement that she handed directly to Saakashvili when he visited their settlement, but had not 
heard back from him afterwards (IDP, Poti, 13.02.12).  
 Writing letters and filing more formal complaints also extends to the MRA. This is in 
some ways a more legitimate course of action than sending letters directly to the President 
since one of the tasks of the MRA is precisely to receive complaints from the IDPs. However, 
it is problematic that the MRA does not answer all the complaints, and that they do not grant 
the same type of aid to similar cases. Complicating matters further, a lot of the IDPs send in 
complaints to the MRA about issues that are outside the ministry’s legal framework, and that 
might have been better suited as a slogan in a demonstration. The government representatives 
from the MRA confirmed that they receive a lot of letters, often five letters from the same 
person or household. In an attempt to relieve the situation the MRA has established an IDP 
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hotline, open all days of the week. The MRA office in Tbilisi has also opened a reception that 
receives IDPs twelve hours a day with consultants ready to answer questions from the IDPs.  
 Sending letters to the government is a form of mobilization primarily conducted by 
individuals, and not collectively. However, the respondents in Poti had made this a joint 
activity by sending letters signed by all residents in the settlement. Their particular issue of 
concern was their electricity bills. By accepting a durable housing solution in the form of a 
new apartment in the regions the IDPs are, according to the Action Plan, transferred from CC 
to PA. The move into private accommodation means that they have to pay for the utilities 
themselves, but in return they receive a slightly higher IDP allowance (6 GEL, 3.6 USD). 
Since the only functioning heating system is electric, and since the relocation took place 
during winter, the IDPs have received electricity bills three times the amount of their IDP 
allowance. Many were unable to pay and as a result the power company cut their access. 
Some IDPs chose to turn off all heating, resulting in below zero temperatures inside. While I 
was in the settlement conducting interviews, people were gathered outside to attend the 
funeral of an elderly lady who had frozen to death in her apartment. This version of the story 
was later disputed, as some IDPs claimed she had already been ill with cancer resulting and it 
was her illness that led to her death. However, the IDPs were in no doubt that cold 
temperatures worsened her existing health conditions.  
With the benefit of hindsight, the IDPs in Poti say that they would never have agreed 
to the resettlement if they had known it would put them in such an unfortunate situation (IDP, 
Poti, 13.02.12). The IDPs have spoken to their Mama Saxlisis, who have organized a petition, 
getting signatures from 150 households and sent it to the minister of MRA, Mr. Sobeliani. 
According to the representative from the local MRA, the Mayor of Poti had decided to 
support the IDPs with money to pay for their electricity, but only one time. The representative 
form the local MRA said:  
When the IDPs mobilize towards the local MRA, they almost always get what they want. We 
will check that they in fact do need money for electricity, by looking at their meters, because 
some IDps know that they can apply for money even though they strictly don’t need it. Some 
IDPs write statements that they need money for the bill, but when we check, the electricity has 
never been used, meaning that they don’t live there (Chachkhiani, 12.02.2012). 101 
In the case of the IDPs in Poti, their mobilization both through letters and through their Mama 
Saxlisi led to success; they received help with their electricity bill, but only one time, so this 
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is not a long-term solution to their problem. For them to be able to pay their own bills now 
that they are privately accommodated, they need employment.  
 The IDPs address their letters to the central and local MRA offices, the local 
municipality, the Mayor and the President’s office. As we saw with the demonstrations, the 
lack of transparency in the governmental structure hinders the IDP mobilization, in that it is 
difficult to identify the governmental organ that is responsible for designing IDP policy and 
making decisions on the future of Georgian IDPs. The IDPs are not wrong in mobilizing 
broadly towards several governmental agencies, because they sometimes receive positive 
responses from all of them. It became relatively clear with the implementation of the Action 
Plan that the MRA is responsible for the implementation of housing solutions. But who 
decides where the housing solutions should be built? And who decides which CCs should be 
emptied and which IDPs should be evicted? These decisions are not necessarily made in the 
MRA, and they are not made in the local MRA offices or by the local municipalities, so the 
only explanation is that they are made within the executive branch of government.  
 As we saw in chapter five, the government has decided to build a new city named 
Lazika, on the West-coast of Georgia. It is meant to accommodate many of the IDPs in PA, 
and this decision was made in the executive branch of government. So the IDPs are in fact 
correct in mobilizing towards the president. The most important decisions are often made at 
the highest level of government. The IDPs know this and thus they mobilize towards this 
branch as well. However, the confusion as to who decides what and when creates a 
responsibility vacuum where it is difficult to identify the actors that are in fact behind the 
decisions. This complicates IDP mobilization further. Such a vacuum of responsibility makes 
it difficult for the IDPs to hold the government accountable for their actions.  
Contacting Media 
Getting the media’s attention is often incorporated as part of the strategy when IDP groups 
mobilize. They try to get the media to cover their demonstrations by sending letters to 
newspapers and TV-stations notifying them about the demonstration. Some also write letters 
to different media channels to tell their stories and create attention around IDP issues in 
general. Even though reports about IDP issues are common in Georgian media, they are often 
about government efforts to improve the lives of Georgian IDPs, such as the building of new 
apartments and rehabilitation of CCs. The bias in the Georgian media makes it difficult for the 
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IDPs to achieve a balanced and fair portrait of their situation that reflects their opinions. This 
bias is created by the lack of free press. Among 173 countries Georgia ranked at the 105th 
place in 2012, down from 99th place since 2010, according to Reporters without Borders102. 
Their poor placement on this scale is connected to their lack of free press;  
We used to have national and local channels that were not controlled by the authorities, today 
I would say that we have three major channels that are all under the control of the government. 
Their news-reports are identical. Information is simply not available, especially not in the 
regions where they don’t have access to TV channels from other countries (Kuparadze, 
13.03.12).  
The main media is under control of the government. The opposition has a hard time making 
their agenda visible on TV in the regions because there are no independent channels available, 
we have one in Tbilisi that broadcasts independent of the government. That is also how the 
government is able to control how people in the region think. The current administration has 
more support in the regions than in Tbilisi simply because people can’t get any other 
information there (Gvalia, 21.02.12).  
With the exception of the independent TV channel created by the NGO Studio Re, available 
in Tbilisi, most TV channels are owned and controlled by the government. When the 
independent TV channel Imedi (hope) was shut down in 2007, it was portrayed by 
international media as a crisis for freedom of speech in Georgia, because it was the only 
independent TV channel that broadcasted to the entire country103.  
The lack of independent media is especially prevalent in the regions, as there are no 
available independent TV channels. This creates a discrepancy between the capital and the 
regions in what information is available and how the IDPs are portrayed in general. This can 
contribute to the general population’s understanding of IDP issues, which might explain the 
difference in the level of integration and discrimination between the capital and the regions. 
As seen in chapter 5, the IDPs in the regions feel less integrated and more discriminated 
against. It would, however, require a separate study to establish whether or not there is a 
causal relationship between the media coverage and the level of integration/discrimination, 
but for now it suffices to say that the lack of unbiased coverage of IDP issues in the regions 
might be a contributing factor.  
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6.3.1 Evaluation of the Contentious Episodes 
The informal groups of IDPs conducting contentious episodes as a channel of mobilization 
differ from the institutionalized organizations in that they do not have direct access to power-
holders, and they lack insight into how and when decisions are made due to the lack of 
transparency in the Georgian government. This affects their mobilization: continuously being 
one step behind the policy makers forces the informal groups to always mobilize 
retroactively, meaning that their mobilization primarily consists of contesting decisions and 
policies that are already enacted. Their ability to change the decisions made depend on the 
visibility of their mobilization. They have to create a lot of public attention to their claims to 
get the message across to Georgian authorities. However, the bias of the Georgian media 
makes it very hard for the IDPs to present their claims, without interference or an angle from 
the media, in the public discourse. Thus, many IDPs try to get through to the Georgian 
authorities directly by sending letters to governmental agencies, but the lack of transparency 
in the Georgian government makes it almost impossible for the IDPs to direct their letters to 
the correct institution.  
 The need to make their demands visible in the public discourse has affected their 
mobilization towards the direction of radicalization, the IDPs are constantly forced to up the 
ante to make themselves heard; self-immolation, threatening suicide and sewing their mouths 
shut might indicate that it is difficult for them to get their messages across. Their Repertoire 
of Contention consists primarily of conducting contentious episodes that draws attention to 
their situation, which in turn puts pressure on the government to resolve the situation. This 
method has gained precedence, meaning that IDPs have seen other IDPs use these methods 
and they try to emulate them to win forth with their own claims. The lack of solidarity and the 
absence of a strong collective identity have created a very fragmented movement. The IDPs 
affected by a certain political decision will mobilize to change it, but they do not receive 
support from other groups of IDPs. The incidents are isolated from each other, and the 
participants vary from time to time. This makes them unable to utilize the potential that lies in 
their number. If they were to mobilize together towards their ultimate shared goals they might 
be more successful in influencing the IDP policy before it is made, rather than after.  
  The institutionalized organizations fear their own demise if they are to adamant in 
their claims towards the government, making it difficult for them to respond to openings in 
the Political Opportunity Structure. The IDPs behind the contentious episodes often have 
nothing to lose, and are more apt to respond to openings in the Political Opportunity 
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Structure. They are motivated to mobilize by the level of grievances they have experienced, 
and they are more unafraid and direct in their encounters with the government. However, their 
lack of insight into the political decision-making process leads to a lack of knowledge in the 
IDP community about these opportunities. They are unable to respond to these opportunities 
because they simply do not know about them. The design and implementation of the Action 
Plan represented an enormous opportunity for the IDPs to influence and affect the decisions 
made for their future. The institutionalized organizations had insight into the process and 
some were invited to take part in formulating the plan, for example the Government-in-Exile 
(Respondent from Government-in-Exile, 27.02.12). The informal groups of IDPs did not 
know that the Action Plan was developed until the government began implementing it, there 
were rumors, but no substantial and trustworthy information was made available to the public 
until it; was finished and adopted (IDP, Tbilisi, 14.03.12). Thus, the IDPs were consequently 
one step behind in the process, and they were not able to make their opinions heard until after 
the Action Plan was adopted.  
6.4 The International Community – an Influential 
Ally  
As seen in 6.1, one of the most important resources available to IDPs is the support they enjoy 
from the international community present in Georgia. The international community consists 
mainly of UNDP, UNHCR, EUMM, and larger international NGOs such as NRC and DRC. 
The NGOs that operate in Georgia have the primary function of dispersing large amounts of 
money from international donors, the main donor being the European Union. The money that 
comes into Georgia via these NGOs is often earmarked for IDP issues; more specifically the 
funding is intended to be used for projects that focus on housing solutions and employment of 
IDPs. The NGOs have also initiated capacity building projects within the Georgian 
government to increase their capacity to deal with IDP issues. By earmarking money 
specifically towards IDP welfare, rather than giving money to improve the situation of the 
poor segment of the Georgian population in general, the donors and NGOs have created a 
strong focus on IDP issues.  
The funding from the EU has made the implementation of the Action Plan possible, as 
the Georgian government could not afford to build and offer durable housing solutions to 
IDPs without the donations from the EU (Tarkhan-Mouravi, 24.02.12). The international 
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community in Georgia, specifically the NGOs that control the funding from the donors, has 
thus come to represent a significant independent power with an enormous influence on 
Georgian IDP policy. Because the NGOs control the money, the Georgian government has to 
listen to the directions and demands presented to them from the NGOs.  
Let us look at an example of how this manifests itself: DRC has implemented a 
capacity building project targeting the MRA. This project is funded by the EU, and deals 
exclusively with IDP policy development and implementation of the Action Plan. Initially, the 
project was run from the DRC headquarters in Tbilisi, but as it required a close cooperation 
with the MRA, the DRC staff working on the project was moved to the MRA and began 
working side by side with the MRA staff. The DRC staff receives a salary from DRC, but 
they work within the MRA structure on specific issues related to the implementation of the 
Action Plan. This gives the DRC staff direct influence on the implementation of the Action 
Plan, but it also exemplifies to what great lengths the Georgian government is willing to go to 
please the international community present in Georgia today (Representative from MRA 
central, 07.03.12, Piranishvili 05.03.12).  
The NGOs function as a mediator between the government and the IDPs. The NGOs speak on 
behalf of IDPs. The problem is that there are too many NGOs trying to influence the 
government, and their efforts are not coordinated. The NGOs focus a lot on integration and 
better welfare in displacement, but not so much on return. This has contributed to shift the 
government’s policies from return to integration (Imedi, 14.02.12).  
The law on IDPs was ratified in 1996, and the state strategy on IDPs was adopted in 2007. 
However, the real work of resettling and accommodating IDPs first began in 2010 with the 
implementation of the Action Plan. So why did the Georgian government wait seventeen 
years before they started accommodating IDPs? The long wait can be explained by three 
separate factors; both the IDPs and the government hoped for a long time that the IDPs would 
be able to return to Abkhazia, and it took time before they were willing to accept the need to 
create a more viable solution for them in displacement. Second, the war in 2008 created a 
renewed feeling of urgency, both among the IDPs and the government. The war created an 
additional caseload of IDPs, and this led to more attention being paid from the government to 
the old caseload of IDPs as well. Third, the war in 2008 came to epitomize the deteriorating 
relationship between Russia and the West, and the increased interest in the region from 
international stakeholders led to an influx of donor money and attention to the consequences 
of the war.  
The government is considering the opinions of NGOs and they try to make key decisions in 
consultation with NGOs. When the IDPs demonstrated against being evicted, the government 
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went back on its decision to evict them and tried to accommodate the IDPs who were affected, 
partly because there were reactions from the NGO community (Piranishvili, 05.03.12).  
Even though there is not an established causation between the increase in donor money 
specifically towards IDP issues after the war in 2008, and the increased focus on IDPs from 
the Georgian government within the same timeframe, it is a probable connection. The 
Saakashvili administration received a lot of support from the Georgian population on account 
of its expressed goals of becoming a member of the EU and NATO. Compliance with the 
demands of western donors and implementation of the Action Plan became possible first of all 
because of the donor money, but also because it was in the Georgian governments self-
interest to comply with the demands of the West, as part of its plan to become part of the EU 
and NATO. The IDPs and the international community both seek to influence the Georgian 
government in focusing on IDP issues, and the next chapter will elaborate on the 
government’s response to these demands.  
6.5 Government Responses to IDP Mobilization 
We have seen that the three main claims set forth by the IDPs are housing, livelihood and 
return. We will now take a look at how the government has received these claims, and 
whether or not they have chosen to accommodate or repress them. Historically, the Georgian 
government has not gone to great lengths to accommodate the IDPs in displacement. The 
Shevardnadze administration kept the IDPs “sitting on their suitcases” by implementing a 
policy of temporary integration.  
There was a policy of temporary integration under Shevardnadze. When I interviewed 
government officials back then, they were open about not wanting the IDPs to integrate, 
because then they would not want to return. I think we still see much of the same policy 
towards IDPs, but the government officials today are told not to talk about this too loud 
(Sumbadze, 27.02.12) 
When Shevardnadze was president, the IDPs were hostages. The government deliberately 
avoided investing in housing for IDPs because they wanted them to be unhappy so that they 
would return if possible. Now the government tries to pursue both integration and return at the 
same time (Piranishvili, 05.03.12).  
These quotes exemplify how the Georgian government has used IDPs as leverage in their 
attempts to reintegrate the breakaway regions. The logic behind deliberately keeping the IDPs 
unhappy and denying them the chance to integrate into society at large, is connected to the 
IDPs’ will to return. If the IDPs were unhappy with their lives in displacement, they would be 
more inclined to return if the opportunity presented itself. By pursuing this policy, the 
government could use the deprivation of the IDPs as a pressure point towards Abkhazia. 
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Granted, the law on IDPs rights was adopted under the Shevardnadze administration, but it 
did not represent a significant improvement for the IDPs.  
 The Rose Revolution and the new administration did not immediately diverge from 
the policy of temporary integration, and the policy was pursued up until the development of 
the State Strategy and the adoption of the Action Plan. These documents represented a 
significant shift in government policy towards IDPS because they presented the IDPs with a 
concrete plan of action with regards to housing solutions and integration (Sumbadze, 
27.02.12). The MRA was tasked with the implementation of the action plan, which led to an 
increase in the responsibilities of the ministry, and turned them into a focal point for IDP 
issues.  
 The remarkable aspect of the relationship between IDPs and government is that their 
goals are identical; the IDPs primarily want better housing solutions, employment and return 
to Abkhazia, and all these goals can be found in the Action Plan. This creates an odd dynamic 
where the two actors are in agreement with what they want to achieve on behalf of IDPs, but 
disagree on how these goals are to be achieved. The Georgian government has met the claim 
of housing with accommodation, rather than repression. The Action Plan describes in detail 
how the government plans to provide all Georgian IDPs with a durable housing solution. The 
initial phases of the plan has already been implemented, and some of the most vulnerable 
IDPS, residing in CCs, have already received a housing solution. Whether or not the 
government is able to complete the plan and provide all IDPs with housing depends largely on 
the continued support from international donors. If they do not receive funding in the future, it 
is not likely that the government will be able to resettle the IDPs accommodated in PA. Even 
though the IDPs are happy that the government is offering durable housing solutions, they do 
not agree with how the government has gone about the process, and they do not agree with the 
resettlement to the regions. Most IDPs would prefer to be resettled close to where they have 
lived while in displacement, they have established connections there and some have 
employment. Moving to a different city is perceived by many IDPs as a second displacement 
(IDP, Tbilisi, 13.03.2012).  
The Georgian government has not yet implemented a policy with regards to 
employment for IDPs. However, this is according to the Action Plan, the livelihood 
component envisioned in the Action Plan is scheduled to be implemented after the 
resettlement process is completed. Furthermore, the resettlement of IDPs to western Georgia 
can be seen as part of the government’s vision of turning this region into a center for 
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commerce. The government has been criticized by the NGO community for not implementing 
the employment and housing components of the Action Plan simultaneously. If the IDPs are 
resettled and then have to wait for a long time before the livelihood component is in place, 
they might move back to their CCs (Kostohryz, 16.03.12). This has to some extent already 
taken place in the case of Potskhoetseri, as many of the IDPs resettled there had no means of 
making a living beyond the IDP allowance, they have moved back to their former housing 
arrangements.  
The IDPs’ right to return to their homes in the breakaway region is mentioned both in 
the State Strategy and in the Action Plan. However, it is difficult to create a specific policy 
regarding the return of the IDPs, as this depends not only on the policy of the Georgian 
government. Working towards the reintegration of the breakaway regions is also not solely an 
IDP issue, and thus not a responsibility taken on by the MRA, rather it is The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that works towards reintegration.  
Georgian authorities have, after 2008, been very susceptible to the needs and claims of 
the IDPs. The Rose Revolution led to a reinforcement of basic democratic principles such as 
freedom of speech, the right of association and the right to assemble, and the Saakashvili 
administration has shown tolerance for public display of political opinions. The IDPs have 
been able to demonstrate without risking ramifications such as imprisonment, and they have 
been able to form organizations that are part of the formal structure of Georgian politics. As 
we have seen, Georgian authorities have tolerated a range of political activities from the IDPs, 
rarely, if ever, suppressing performances of contentious politics.  
The Representative from the MRA indicated that the next step in IDP policy is to shift 
from a status-based approach to a needs-based approach this means that only the IDPs who, 
by definition of the government, need aid will receive it (07.03.12). This change in policy, 
although not yet implemented might be a welcomed change, as it allows for the government 
to focus their efforts on the IDPs that are most vulnerable.  
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7 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this last chapter I present my main findings in a final discussion on political mobilization of 
Georgian IDPs. I will return to the main topic of research as it was presented in chapter one, 
and examine it in light of the theoretical framework and empirical data.  
The Shevardnadze administration, with its policy on temporary integration, led the 
IDPs to believe that return to the breakaway regions was right around the corner. Thinking 
that they would return within a relatively short timeframe they did not mentally prepare to 
integrate and settle down in Georgia proper. The mentality of continuously postponing their 
return preserved for several years, and the IDPs were kept “sitting on their suitcases”. 
Growing increasingly impatient with their housing arrangements and inability to go on with 
their lives, the IDPs were more than ready to believe Saakashvili when he declared that he 
would reunite Georgia with its breakaway regions under the Rose Revolution. The 
Saakashvili administration enjoyed massive support among the IDP community, and once 
again, they believed that the option to return to their homes in Abkhazia would manifest itself. 
The State Strategy and the Action Plan were welcomed within the IDP community, even 
though the documents did not imply a step further towards return. The Action Plan also 
signified that the new administration took the needs of the IDPs seriously and intended to 
provide them with a viable alternative as long as they were still in displacement.  
Five years after the revolution, the Saakashvili administration had not yet implemented 
the Action Plan, and the IDPs were still waiting for something to happen, when suddenly, 
everything happened at once. The war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia led to the 
displacement of Georgians from South Ossetia. The new caseload of IDPs received durable 
housing solutions from the international community and donors, within three months of the 
war. The IDPs displaced from Abkhazia had been displaced for fifteen years at the time, and 
were still waiting for proper housing. This discriminatory treatment was not necessarily 
conducted with malicious intent from the government, it happened as a result of several 
factors. First of all, Georgia became interesting to the western world as a result of the war 
with Russia. Russia’s first invasion since the fall of the Soviet Union104 was not received 
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lightly in Western Europe, and the EU mobilized their support to help Georgia. This support 
largely came in the form of monetary aid, specifically earmarked IDPs, and as the money was 
available almost immediately after the war, it enabled the building of durable housing 
solutions for the new caseload of IDPs in a short amount of time. The Georgian government, 
with its Western-oriented policies, has had an explicit desire to become part of the European 
Union and NATO since it came into power. This made the government very susceptible to the 
demands of the western NGOs operating within Georgia, and to the demands of the EU as 
their primary donor. The focus of the NGOs and the EU has been IDPs and state building in 
Georgia since they became involved in the country. The funding from the EU is primarily 
managed by the NGOs, but a substantial amount is given directly to the Georgian 
government. It is not possible to state that there is a causal relationship between the increase 
in funding after the 2008 war and the increased focus from the government on IDP issues, but 
it is a reasonable assumption considering that the focus on IDPs took place subsequently after 
the increase in funding.  
The implementation of the Action Plan began in May 2010. The government began by 
building apartment blocks in the regions of western Georgia, intended for the IDPs that were 
identified as the most vulnerable. This was determined by looking at the quality of their 
housing arrangements. The resettlement process began spring 2011, and the government 
simultaneously initiated large-scale rehabilitations of old CCs and evictions of IDPs who 
resided in CCs illegally or who had offered a housing solution elsewhere, but not yet moved. 
The implementation of the Action Plan led to two things; first it created a realization within 
the IDP community that the Georgian government had shifted their focus from return to 
integration, secondly it led to an increase in the political mobilization of the Georgian IDPs 
displaced from Abkhazia.  
The Georgian IDPs have been a part of the political scene in Georgia since they were 
displaced, represented primarily by the Government-in-Exile, Mama Saxlisis and later the 
political party the European Democrats of Georgia. These institutionalized organizations 
communicated with different levels of Georgian authorities and lobbied for IDP interests. The 
increase in political mobilization came primarily from informal groups of Georgian IDPs 
gathering around certain events or changes in IDP policy. The implementation of the Action 
Plan represented a significant opening in the Political Opportunity Structure, and the informal 
groups of IDPs utilized this opening to state their claims and make themselves heard, 
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primarily through demonstrations and letters to governmental officials. The IDPs managed to 
utilize the opportunity presented to them, primarily through employing their most important 
resource; their support in the international community. The war in 2008 had as mentioned 
created a large interest from the international community, and the IDPs now found that they 
had an influential ally that was putting pressure on the Georgian government towards 
focusing on IDP issues.  
The Action Plan contains an extensive, detailed outline of how the government plans 
to provide the IDPs with durable housing solutions and employment, so what were the IDPs 
mobilizing towards? The fact that the government and the IDPs are in agreement of what they 
want for the future of Georgian IDPs complicates matters further. What we see here is a 
trifecta of actors; the international community, the IDPs and the Georgian government all 
working for the welfare of the IDPs, so wherein lies the conflict? What is there to mobilize 
towards when they are in agreement with the authorities? The Georgian government has 
implemented the Action Plan largely without consulting with the IDPs. The plan states that 
the IDPs should be given a choice when deciding upon their durable housing solution. In 
reality, the IDPs have been presented with the choice of accepting the housing solution 
offered by the government or becoming homeless. Therein lies the main point of contention 
between the IDPs and the government. Both actors have the same ultimate goals on behalf of 
the Georgian IDPs, but it is the road towards these goals that they disagree upon. The IDPs 
have utilized the international community as a support system, by creating awareness around 
wrongfully implemented policy through demonstrations and media attention, the international 
community has become aware of the problem and put pressure on the Georgian government 
to correct this. Afraid to upset their main donor and their chances of becoming part of the 
European Union, the government largely complies with the objections of the international 
community.  
The NGOs have acquired a powerful position and become an authority on IDP issues 
that the government actively uses as a consultant. This has led to some IDPs feeling 
overlooked by the government, and that the NGOs do not necessarily manage to give an 
accurate representation of IDP interests. However, IDP interests are also represented through 
the institutionalized organizations that they have managed to establish, and the Mama Saxlisis 
are a good example of how IDP interests are communicated to the government on a local 
level. The organizations have the opportunity to lobby directly towards power-holders and 
have, for example with the case of the European Democrats, been effective in putting IDP 
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issues on the agenda. These organizations main quality in terms of mobilization is that the 
representatives have an extensive network that allows them to access important information 
on IDP issues. This enables them to influence decisions on IDP issues before they are made. 
The informal groups do not have access to the same information, which, as we have seen 
earlier, is due to the lack of transparency in the Georgian government. Acquiring information 
on governmental policies is not easy for the informal groups, which puts them in the 
unfortunate position of having to mobilize largely retroactively. They find out about changes 
in government policies only after they are made, changing these decisions requires a higher 
amount of visibility and public attention. If they manage to achieve that, like they did when 
they demonstrated against the evictions, they often get the international community on their 
side and thus they are able to more effectively put pressure on the Georgian government.  
The first topic of this thesis was to establish whether or not the Georgian IDPs 
displaced from Abkhazia have mobilized politically, in short: yes, they have! As we have 
seen, the Georgian IDPs identified three main goals for themselves; housing, employment and 
return. The Implementation of the Action Plan led to an increase in IDP mobilization towards 
the goal of housing specifically. This is related to the fact that the Georgian government is 
currently implementing the housing policy outlined in the Action Plan. The next component 
of the Action Plan is employment. When this component is to be implemented we might see 
an increase in IDP mobilization towards this goal. As they do not have access to information 
beforehand, it is likely that the mobilization of Georgian IDPs will follow the implementation 
of the Action Plan.  
The second topic of research outlined was to identify the form that the mobilization 
has assumed. As we have seen above, the IDPs have mobilized primarily through two 
channels; formal and institutionalized organizations and informal groups of IDPs conducting 
contentious episodes in relation to specific events or changes in policy. The main difference 
between these two channels, both working towards the same goal; the welfare of Georgian 
IDPs, is their Repertoires of Contention. In the theoretical framework we saw that movements 
employ their Repertoire of Contention when mobilizing, meaning that they have a toolbox of 
different expressions of contention that they use according to the situation and the context. 
Tilly differentiates between an old and a new Repertoire of Contention. He defines the old 
Repertoire as what was in use before 1700, and the new Repertoire as everything that has 
been in use since (Tilly, 2006:51). Even though the timeline is different for this thesis, the 
theoretical concept works as parable to this situation. The informal organizations conducting 
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contentious episodes largely draw on a Repertoire of Contention formed under the Soviet 
Union. Sending letters to governmental officials is the best example of this. They are 
accustomed to Soviet Style mobilization, and have not yet developed a new Repertoire of 
Contention suited for the democratic state that Georgia aspires to become. The 
institutionalized organizations, on the other hand, have adopted a new Repertoire of 
Contention more in line with what is used in Western democracies. They lobby and put 
pressure on government officials in an attempt to put IDP issues on the agenda. Repertoires of 
Contention are malleable, and change according to the type of regime they are used within. 
Thus, it is likely that if the new generation of IDPs were to mobilize some time from now, one 
might find that the mobilization is expressed using different tools. The two Repertoires of 
Contention coexist within the framework of the same state, and are thus a good example of 
how the mobilizing actors are susceptible to changes in governance.  
 The Repertoires of Contention is an example of an internal resource available to the 
group, the second internal resource described in this thesis is their motivation to mobilize; 
their deprivation. Gurr’s theory on Relative Deprivation stipulates that if a group experiences 
severe grievances, they will become motivated to correct the situation, especially if there is a 
large discrepancy between what the actors have envisioned for themselves, their value 
expectancy, and what they receive, their value capabilities (Gurr, 1970). The IDPs were 
accustomed to a different life than what they have now, and by comparing their lives in 
Abkhazia and their lives in displacement, they feel deprived of the future they could have had 
if they had not been displaced. Seeing as they have been displaced for nineteen years, many 
have accustomed themselves somewhat to the current level of discomfort, even though they 
are living from day to day with regards to income. They do not mobilize because they are 
displaced, they mobilize when there is an added grievance to their situation. This means that 
if something happens that skews the fragile balance they have achieved for the worse, they are 
very easily mobilized. This can be exemplified by the IDPs in Poti who, by accepting a 
housing solution, were moved to private sector and thereby had to pay their own utility bills. 
The increase in their expenses completely ruined their personal economy, resulting in the 
mobilization of the entire settlement, and their success in having the local municipality paying 
for their bills. Additionally, many of the IDPs value expectancies were raised with the 
implementation of the Action Plan. They thought that they would finally be able to begin a 
new life in displacement, settle down properly and find employment. Thus their 
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disappointment became immense when they were offered apartments in Potskhoetseri, far 
away from everything and without possibilities.  
 A third internal resource mentioned in the theoretical framework was that of group 
identity. The formation of a strong and cohesive group identity can lead to solidarity and 
loyalty among the members of a movement. The IDPs do not share a strong collective 
identity, most likely because they are not that different from the local population in terms of 
ethnicity, religion or language. They do not wish to define themselves out of the Georgian 
national community, rather they are offended at the notion of being classified as IDPs, and 
thus as a separate group from the population at large. The strong wish to integrate themselves 
into the local community has led them to downplay their IDP status, while at the same time 
highlighting it when they interact with government officials. They are ambiguous to the IDP 
status, partly because it is connected to poverty and thus to shame, and partly because they are 
proud to be from Abkhazia and to have survived the war and the following displacement. This 
duality is difficult to merge into one comprehensive framework for collective identity that can 
serve as a basis for solidarity and loyalty between the IDPs. The term internally displaced 
carries connotations that the IDPs do not want to be associated with. The lack of employment, 
dependency on the state, lack of education and general discrimination towards the IDPs is a 
dangerous tendency that if not corrected, might lead to the creation not only of the IDPs as a 
social category, but as a lower class ostracized from society at large.  
 A fourth internal resource available to the IDPs is their ability to organize and thus 
maintain a high level of contention while facing a powerful contender (Tilly, 1978). The 
Georgian IDPs have not managed to establish one organization that unites the movement and 
acts as a spokesperson for all of them, but they have nevertheless managed to sustain their 
mobilization over a longer period of time. Through the institutionalized organizations the 
IDPs are guaranteed a continuous representation in Parliament and in the local municipalities. 
These organizations might not be willing to take the same amount of risks as the informal 
groups are because they are afraid that if they do they might lose their influence, but their 
moderation ensures the continued representation of IDPs, thereby becoming a tradeoff 
between political gain and representation. Tilly describes a situation where several 
organizations compete over the same resources, thus eliminating or reducing claims made by 
competing organizations (Tilly, 1978). As the IDP organizations represent IDPs in different 
levels of government, there is little if any competition between the three. However, as the 
MRA has gained influence and responsibilities for IDP issues, it is possible to imagine a 
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scenario where they gradually become a mouthpiece for IDP needs and issues in Georgia 
society. This is especially expected to happen when the international community withdraws 
from Georgia, which is to be expected to happen in the near future. As the funding that goes 
into creating durable housing solutions for IDPs are earmarked by the international donors, 
the IDPs do not really have to compete with other groups in the Georgian society at large for 
monetary resources. This might change when the donors stop prioritizing Georgia as a 
recipient, at which point it would be interesting to conduct a similar study to see if the 
political mobilization of Georgian IDPs becomes stronger.  
 We have now seen how the IDPs have employed their internal resources; let us take a 
look at the external. The main external resource available to the IDP movement is the support 
they enjoy from the international community present in Georgia. The dynamics between the 
international community, the government and the IDPs have already been discussed to some 
extent, but it should be mentioned that when the international community pulls out of Georgia 
the IDPs will have to fend for themselves. There have been NGOs present in Georgia since 
the wars in the early 1990s, and the IDPs are therefore accustomed to having a powerfully 
ally that comes to their rescue when needed. The absence of the NGOs will create a 
responsibility vacuum, and the government will become freer in its policies towards the IDPs, 
without the corrective that the international community has represented. One possibility is 
that new local NGOs will emerge and take over the role that the international community has 
had, but without the monetary support from the donors it is difficult to imagine that they 
would become equally as powerful with regards to making the government listen.  
A second external factor, which is presented in the theoretical framework by Tarrow 
and that affects mobilization, is the movement’s ability to respond and utilize openings in the 
Political Opportunity Structure to gain access to the political arena (2011:9). The mobilizing 
actors define what constitutes a political opportunity it is not defined objectively. The theory 
is that movements respond to their surroundings and use changes that occur in the political 
structure to their advantage. The two channels for political mobilization among the Georgian 
IDPs utilize opportunities differently. We have seen that the organizations representing IDPs 
are not able to take risks because they are concerned with keeping their position and ensuring 
the continued representation of IDP interests. The informal groups are more apt to take 
advantage of these opportunities, as they have no power to lose. However, as there is little 
transparency in the Georgian government, it is difficult for the informal groups to identify 
openings in the Political Opportunity Structure. As we have seen, they mobilize mostly 
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retroactively due to the lack of information. Political Opportunities do present themselves to 
both channels of mobilization, but neither channel has the appropriate tools to seize these 
opportunities. Mobilizing actors who wish to gain access to the political arena often seize 
openings in the Political Opportunity Structure to gain a seat at the table (Tarrow, 2011). The 
Georgian IDPs are already represented in the political arena by several organizations within 
the governmental structure.  
The last topic of research was to determine whether or not the IDPs have been 
successful in achieving their goals, determined by the government response to their 
mobilization. As we saw above, the goals of the IDPs overlap with the goals the government 
has on behalf of IDPs. Thus, they work towards the same ultimate goal, which is in itself 
beneficial for the IDPs, even though the government’s goals did not come about as a result of 
IDP mobilization. We have seen that the Georgian IDPs mobilize primarily towards housing 
and employment, and not equally as much towards return. This is probably connected to their 
lack of ability to influence the realization of this goal, as it is not only dependent on the 
policies of the Georgian state. They remain ambiguous towards stating that integration is their 
primary goal, and they always include return, even if it is just symbolically. The Georgian 
IDPs have been successful in their mobilization by utilizing their resources, particularly the 
support they enjoy from the international community. By putting pressure on the government 
to provide them with a durable housing solution, they have managed to instigate the 
implementation of the Action Plan, with a lot of help from international donors and the strong 
will in the Georgia government to appease these donors. They continue to mobilize towards 
improving the quality of aid that they receive from the government, and when they manage to 
create enough attention towards their goals they are successful.  
According to Tarrow, a movement is likely to either become institutionalized or 
dissolve when met with accommodation from the government (Tarrow, 2011). The Georgian 
IDPs have to some extent already been institutionalized, in the form of the organizations 
representing them within the governmental structure. Whether or not they will continue to 
mobilize once the Action Plan has been implemented, or if the movement will dissolve when 
their official goals of housing and employment are met, depends largely on whether or not the 
infrastructural integration of housing and livelihood is paired with social integration. Social 
integration entails that the IDPs form an integral part of the Georgian society, and feel that 
they are part of the national community. Without becoming socially integrated, the IDPs are 
at risk of becoming ostracized and excluded in their settlements.  
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 This thesis has examined the political mobilization of Georgian IDPs, showing that the 
IDPs have in fact mobilized and to a great extent succeeded with the help of the international 
community. The implementation of the Action Plan has led to a shift in government policies 
from temporary integration, to permanent integration, however with a continued emphasis on 
the IDPs’ right to return. Whether or not the option of return presents itself in the future, it is 
an important and valuable step forward that they are now presented with viable and adequate 
housing solutions.  
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Appendix  
1. Interview format for interviews with IDPs 
1. Government policies:  
1.1 Do you agree with the current government policies to IDPs?  
1.2 Some of the Collective Centers in Tbilisi were emptied and the IDPs living there were 
evicted. What do you think about that?  
1.3 What is the most important goal for IDPs today?  
1.4 Who decides what happens to/the future of Georgian IDPs?  
1.5 Do you think the IDP community has power in political life in Georgia? Do you think the 
Georgian exile government from Abkhazia has political power?  
1.6 How do you think IDPs can make their own situation better? What can the IDP 
community do to change their situation?  
1.7 Where would you go to get more information about your rights? If there were any changes 
in your rights as an IDP would you get information about it?  
1.8 Since you have lived in displacement, have you received any help from the government or 
NGOs?  
1.9 If the IDP allowance would be taken away tomorrow, would you do something to get it 
back?  
1.10 Do you think the government is aware of the IDPs situation? Do you think they know 
about your problems/difficulties?  
1.11 If you had a serious problem, would you actively tell the local governments/NGOs or 
would you wait for them to help you?  
2. Political participation:  
2.1 Do you vote in all/any of the presidential/parliamentary elections? If yes, do you vote for 
a candidate that you feel will help IDPs specifically? Have you ever participated in any 
demonstrations? Are you a member of any political parties? Do you participate in any 
organizations working to bettering the situations of IDPS? When you vote, which 
politicians/party do you feel best represent your political opinions? Do they speak specifically 
to IDPs? If so, how?  
2.2 Was there ever a time when you felt it especially important to participate politically?  
102 
2.3 If yes, how did you participate/express yourself?  
3. Discrimination:  
3.1 Do you feel that your IDP status is in any way hindering you? Are there any activities that 
you can’t be a part of because you are an IDP? 
4. Social networks:  
4.1 Who/where would you ask for help if you found yourself in a troublesome situation?  
4.2 If you wanted to change something in your local community, how would you go about 
changing it?  
5. Integration:  
5.1 Do you feel yourself integrated in the local community? Do you feel the same level of 
integration in Georgia as you did in Abkhazia?  
5.2 Are there any ways that you feel you are left out of the local community?  
5.3 How do you see the relationship between IDPs and the local community at large?  
6. Identity:  
6.1 What topics are you interested in? What engages you and what makes you aggravated?  
6.2 Is there a sense of community among the IDPs?  
6.3 When you meet new people, do you mention that your are an IDP?  
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A) Expert Respondents 
 
Category: Name:  Representing: Place:  Date : 
NGO Anonymous Georgian Young 
Lawyers (GYLA) 
Tbilisi 01.03.2012 
NGO Eka Gvalia Head of Charity 
Humanitarian 
Centre Abkhazeti 
(CHACA) 
Tbilisi 21.02.2012 
NGO Mamuka 
Kuparadze 
Studio Re 
(Independent TV 
Channel) 
Tbilisi 13.03.2012 
NGO Petr Kostohryz Head of 
Norwegian 
Refugee 
Council(NRC), 
Georgia 
Tbilisi 16.03.2012 
NGO Vakhtang 
Piranishvili 
Representative 
from CARE, 
Georgia 
Tbilisi 05.03.2012 
NGO Anonymous Representative 
from CHCA  
Zugdidi 13.02.2012 
NGO Anonymous Representative 
from Atinati 
Zugdidi 13.02.2012 
NGO Anonymous Representatives 
from Imedi 
Zugdidi 14.02.2012 
European 
Democrats 
Paata Davitaia MP in Parliament Tbilisi 09.03.2012 
MRA Anonymous Head of IDP 
Department 
Central MRA 
Tbilisi 07.03.2012 
Local MRA Roman 
Chachkiani 
Representative 
from local IDP 
department in Poti 
Poti 12.02.2012 
Abkhaz 
Government-
in-Exile 
Anonymous Representative 
from Abkhaz 
Government-in-
Exile, Education 
Department 
Tbilisi 27.02.2012 
Institute for 
Policy Studies 
George 
Tarkhan-
Mouravi 
Academic and 
Researcher 
Tbilisi 24.02.2012 
Institute for 
Policy Studies 
Nana Sumbadze Psychologist and 
Academic 
Tbilisi 27.02.2012 
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B) IDP Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender: Age: From: Date: Place: 
Woman 37 Sukhumi 13.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Woman 34 Sukhumi 13.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Man 39 Sukhumi 14.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Man 47 Sukhumi 14.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Woman 46 Sukhumi 13.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Man 67 Sukhumi 13.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Man 50 Gali 14.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Woman 28 Gali 13.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Woman 78 Gali 14.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Woman  83 Gali 14.03.2012 Tbilisi 
Woman 34 Gali 10.02.2012 Poti 
Man 63 Gali 11.02.2012 Poti 
Man & 
Woman 
53, 54 Gudauta 11.02.2012 Poti 
Woman 53 Gagra 12.02.2012 Poti 
Woman  45 Ochamchire 11.02.2012 Poti 
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